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The long history of EU-Turkey relations paved Turkey’s path towards membership in 2005, 
though she is still a candidate country. After 2013, the stagnated relationship between the 
two increased the emphasis on strategic partnership more than membership, while less 
emphasis was given to ideational factors in the literature. In addition, the role of ideational 
factors in the EU’s enlargement policy remains understudied. To contribute to the literature, 
this study aims to explain the shift in discourses of identity through a discourse-historical 
analysis (DHA) of the EU’s identity-based approaches towards Turkey between 2013 and 
2016 based on the social constructivist theory. Guided by the literature between 1999 and 
2013, this thesis observes the themes through which Europeanness and Turkishness were 
constructed as a result of certain milestones in the relations. Taking 2013 as a major milestone 
because of the Gezi Park Protests and corruption investigations in Turkey which increased 
the EU’s concerns on Turkey’s democratic status, it is possible to observe the shifts in 
discourses of identity by analyzing 18 parliamentary debates on Turkey in the European 
Parliament which is a strong influencer in the EU’s enlargement policy. The analysis shows 
that Turkey was perceived as the EU’s geographical, cultural, historical, religious and 
civilizational other before 2013. In addition, Turkey was also presented as an acceding state 
to the EU which had democratic and territorial disputes. Between 2013 and 2016, Turkey 
was mostly perceived as the EU’s undemocratic other, while religious, civilizational and 
geographical discourses were still present.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
NE SENLE, NE DE SENSİZ: TÜRKİYE-AB İLİŞKİLERİNDE KİMLİK 
SÖYLEMLERİNDEKİ DEĞİŞİMLER 
 
 
 
ERMAN ERMİHAN 
 
SİYASET BİLİMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Senem Aydın-Düzgit 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, Türkiye, Kimlik, Söylev 
 
Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin uzun tarihi Türkiye’ye 2005 yılında adaylık yolu açsa da, Türkiye 
hala aday ülke olarak yoluna devam etmektedir. İkili arasındaki durağan ilişki 2013 
sonrasında üyelikten daha çok stratejik partnerliğin öne çıkarılmasına yol açmıştır. 
seviyesine gelmiş ve literatürde kimlik çalışmalarına daha az yer verilmiştir. Bu boşluğu 
doldurmak üzere bu çalışma, AB’nin Türkiye’ye olan kimlik temelli yaklaşımlarını 2013-
2016 arası dönemde, sosyal inşacı perspektiften söylevsel-tarihsel eleştirel söylev analizi 
(ESA) metoduyla açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. 1999-2013 arası literatürden faydalanarak, 
ilişkilerdeki belli kırılma noktaları Avrupalılığın ve Türklüğün hangi temalar üzerinden inşa 
edildiğine bakılarak incelenebilir. Gezi Parkı protestoları ve yolsuzluk soruşturmaları 
sebebiyle 2013 yılı büyük bir kırılma noktası olarak alındığında, AB nezdinde Türkiye’nin 
demokratik durumu hakkında endişelerin arttığını ve kimlik söylevlerinin değiştiğini Türkiye 
hakkında yapılan 18 Avrupa Parlamentosu oturumu üzerinden çıkarmak ve Avrupa 
Parlamentosu’nun AB’nin genişleme politikasında önemli bir aktör olduğunu belirtmek 
mümkündür. Analiz sonucunda, 2013 öncesinde Türkiye’nin AB’nin coğrafi, kültürel, 
tarihsel, dinsel ve medeniyetsel öteki olarak görüldüğü ortaya çıkmıştır. Ek olarak Türkiye, 
AB üyeliğine aday ancak demokratik ve sınırsal problemler yaşayan bir ülke olarak 
tanımlanmıştır. 2013 ve 2016 yılları arasında, Türkiye, çoğunlukla AB’nin demokratik 
olmayan öteki olarak görülmüş, dini, medeniyetsel ve coğrafi söylemler de hala varlığını 
sürdürmüştür.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
As widely recognized, Turkey and the EU have an extensive history which officially dates 
to 1959, way before it was the Union as we know it today. Since then, it could be argued that 
their history and relationship have been delicate. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate 
country in 1999 and the start of the accession negotiations in 2005 paved the way for a 
different momentum in the EU-Turkey relations. Nevertheless, Turkey remains a candidate 
country.  
 
Despite all the obstacles the EU and Turkey have, they continue with their relations based on 
mutual strategic objectives. For this reason, a satiric title is chosen for this thesis. “With or 
without you” is not only the name of an emotional rock song by U2 but is also suitable to 
depict the current situation of the EU-Turkey relations as well. Although both sides express 
their strong desire to cooperate based on common objectives, they are reluctant to show 
progress towards membership.  
 
One crucial reason for this which is often understated could be sought in discourses and 
identity constructions. Throughout their extensive relationship, the EU’s ideational role in 
relation to Turkey and its foreign policy have been under observation, although they have 
been receiving less attention in recent years. Overall, culture, geography, history and religion 
were recognized in the literature to be the recurring ideational themes in the EU-Turkey 
relations. However, as the EU was going through several enlargement rounds and crises while 
trying to reconstruct its own identity, Turkey was seeking her place in the EU framework 
while re-structuring and positioning her identity. Thus, the ideational themes were constantly 
reshaped and reconstructed. 
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In different periods, it is not difficult to observe how identities are being re-structured 
differently in the EU-Turkey relations. Especially after 1999, when Turkey’s accession path 
took a crucial turn towards EU membership, a surge in identity constructions in the EU 
became evident. That is not to argue, however, that identity constructions were non-existent 
in the relations, as they could possibly be traced as far back to the very initial interactions 
between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, which are still often-mentioned historical 
references. Nevertheless, the emphasis on and use of different ideational themes in the EU’s 
foreign policy discourses varied across time.  
 
Understanding and analyzing foreign policy through discourses are relatively contemporary 
approaches in the fields of Political Science and International Relations. The intricacies 
between linguistics and foreign policy are revealing in the sense that they uncover and trace 
identity constructions and their traits. In recent years, discursive studies have been receiving 
increased attention by relying on different theoretical frameworks and methodologies. 
Similarly, studies that apply discursive methods on the EU-Turkey relations are now easily 
noticeable and growing in numbers. Political speeches, news articles, parliamentary debates, 
interviews and the like are now in the toolkit of discursive studies. Exemplary literature using 
such resources will be provided as this thesis advances.    
 
Until 2013, various discursive studies that focus on the EU-Turkey relations using the 
identity-membership spectrum were common, especially the ones that reflect Turkey’s 
perceptions of the EU. However, after 2013, the studies that explore the identity dimension 
in the EU-Turkey relations are in decline. Studies that reflect the EU’s perceptions of Turkey 
are in decline as well. In addition, as the literature points out, 2013 is argued to be a year in 
the EU-Turkey relations that sets a big divide which changed the existing themes of identity 
(Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). The deterioration of the relations caused culture, 
geography, history and religion-based identity themes to yield themselves to concerns on 
democracy and freedom of expression.  
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In the literature, a lot of emphasis, especially after 2002, was given to the identity 
constructions in the EU-Turkey relations (Aydın-Düzgit 2015c; Dağı 2005; Macmillan 2013; 
Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın 2007; Rumelili 2008; Rumelili 2011; Turunç 2011). In relation to 
Turkey’s active foreign policy in the AKP period, the literature was prevalent on the 
constructions of identity in the EU-Turkey relations that focus on interests and religious and 
cultural dualities between the two. Furthermore, comparative studies that focus on ideational 
factors were also common. The comparative analysis by Morozov and Rumelili (2012) is one 
contemporary example that aims to observe how Turkey and Russia contributed to the 
identity construction of Europe by challenging it. Other studies explored certain themes in 
discourses, particularly security, by considering institutional settings in terms of identity 
constructions, as done by Aydın-Düzgit (2013).   
 
After 2013, studies that included discursive and ideational approaches declined in numbers, 
although there are still some contemporary examples (Arkan 2016; Aydın-Düzgit 2015c; 
Türkeş-Kılıç 2019). A recent example that covers the EU-Turkey relations from an identity 
and cultural-based perspective through CDA is a research conducted by Aydın-Düzgit et al. 
(2018) by focusing on newspaper articles, editorials, and journals published between 1946 
and 1999. Nevertheless, as a result of several factors that will be elaborated further, the EU-
Turkey relations started to be discussed more in relation to alternative forms of integration. 
As the relations between the two deteriorated and the prospect of membership withered away 
for Turkey, alternative forms of integration such as “strategic partnership” and “differentiated 
integration” came to the fore (Müftüler-Baç 2018; Kaya 2018; Kaygusuz 2018).  
 
As often argued, the recent focus on alternative forms of integration emerges from the rising 
bilateral dependency especially on economic, political, and security matters. For instance, 
both actors have been significant trading partners to one another. In addition, with the rise of 
political instability in the EU’s close neighborhood, Turkey started to gain an important 
position in securing her own and EU’s borders. With the surge in the flow of refugees to 
Europe and Turkey, Turkey acquired the “gatekeeper” role (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani 
2016) by accepting more than 3.5 million refugees and asylum seekers. In general, although 
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the discourses of the AKP government confirm Turkey’s willingness to become an EU 
member, the de facto situation favors alternative forms of integration.  
 
While studies that focus on strategic partnership and differentiated integration have been 
receiving attention, ideational factors and the shift from them to new integration models are 
not prioritized enough. As the prospects of membership for Turkey are in decline, the change 
in the models of identity are due to fade in the literature. However, as this thesis will argue, 
identity-based issues are still present and have a major role in shaping the foreign policy of 
the EU towards Turkey. As the analysis part of this thesis will observe, the ideational matters 
are still at the core of the debates between the EU and Turkey, although in a changing fashion 
after 2013. Combined with the alternative forms of integration, the perspectives of the EU 
towards Turkey are transforming as the accession negotiations continue to stagnate. 
 
When thought in relation to Turkey’s accession process, Türkeş-Kılıç (2019) argues that the 
stagnant EU-Turkey relations are also due to the reluctancy of the EU to include Turkey as a 
member. Institutionally, one of the major areas that causes this reluctancy within the EU 
framework is the EP. The EP is argued to have a strong influence over the EU-Turkey 
relations through its discussions and resolutions, frequently underlining Turkey’s growing 
distance with the EU (Gürkan 2018). Indeed, when the EP resolutions on Turkey, for 
instance, are observed after 2013, it could be suggested that they have a big impact on setting 
the political climate with Turkey (European Parliament 2013b; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 
2018; 2019).  
 
The EP is also argued to be a significant influencer in the EU enlargement and accession 
processes. For this reason, this study aims at both emphasizing the shift in 2013 between 
different types of identity-related issues and the role of the EP by observing the discourses 
of the MEPs. To accomplish this, this study benefits from the European parliamentary 
debates on Turkey between 2013 and 2016, starting the temporal period after the Gezi Park 
Protests and terminating it before the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, focusing on the period 
between two important milestones in recent Turkish politics. In order to identify a milestone 
in 2013 for the shift in discourses of identity, a prior reading of the EU-Turkey relations is 
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necessary to trace, where possible, recurring themes of identity-based discourses and where 
present, the changes in identity representations.  
 
Observing the incidents between 1999 and 2002 is beneficial in providing the historical 
background that had an impact on identity constructions. The coalition government in Turkey 
initiated the primary political reforms in the path to EU membership. During that period, 
EU’s discourses on Turkey increased and were mostly based on identity (Levin 2011). 
However, the political turbulence within the coalition government weakened the expectations 
that Turkey would accelerate its attempts to sustain democracy and grasp EU membership 
(Johansson-Nogués and Jonasson 2011). AKP’s election in 2002 changed this perception 
towards Turkey. The continuation of the political reform process after the election of AKP 
has shown that Turkey was determined to be a candidate in the process of EU membership. 
The reforms generally paved the way for a positive atmosphere in the EU-Turkey relations.  
 
This relatively positive atmosphere in the EU-Turkey relations changed after 2007 following 
few domestic and external incidents. Coupled with the vetoes by France and Cyprus on 
opening new chapters, AKP’s gradual breakaway from the EU reforms and struggle with the 
secularist cadre parted Turkey’s way with the EU (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). Since 
then, especially after 2013, Turkey’s declining democracy have been gaining prominence in 
the literature (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 2012). The emerging literature on Turkey’s drift 
towards “competitive authoritarianism” (Esen and Gumuscu 2016), following the Gezi Park 
Protests, reflects a significant change in the EU-Turkey relations. On the public side, it is 
also visible to observe the changing dynamics in Turkish NGOs’ perceptions (David and 
Pinto 2017) and in the decline of EU public support towards Turkey’s membership. 
(Lindgaard 2018) Furthermore, corruption and bribery investigations on December 17-25, 
2013 increased concerns on Turkish democracy. Thus, Turkey’s current position in relation 
to EU is based on a confrontational position. 
 
Being a public movement involving various societal segments, the Gezi Park Protests 
represent a mass demonstration in Turkey that targeted the AKP government and its policies 
against public spaces. The literature emphasizes the demand for public spaces that gather 
6 
 
diverse societal groups (Göle 2013) and the demand for an anti-authoritarian government 
(Öniş 2015) as the main drivers of the protests. In addition, the dissatisfaction with neo-
conservative and neoliberal capitalist practices could be included among the reasons behind 
the protests (Önal 2016). With these elements in its core, the Gezi Park Protests also 
challenged EU-Turkey relations by triggering reactions from various EU officials and 
member states. Nevertheless, in the post-Gezi Park Protests period, the AKP government did 
not lose much of its power in the following elections, as it gradually steered away from the 
EU. As it strongly held onto power, the EU membership was already out of its priorities.  
 
The December, 17-25 corruption and bribery investigations were considerably one of the 
biggest incidents of rivalry between the AKP government and the Gulen Movement, which 
would later be known as FETO that added to the EU’s growing concerns following the Gezi 
Park Protests. It is another major incident after the Gezi Park Protests in which the incumbent 
government tried to defend its hold onto power, while major figures from the party, including 
some of their family members, were arrested. In the following years, the political rivalry 
between the AKP government and the Gulen Movement intensified, paving the way for the 
July 15 coup attempt in 2016. The coup attempt clearly demarcated the lines between the 
government and FETO supporters (Yavuz and Koç 2016) and significantly damaged the EU-
Turkey relations.  
 
The last major incident that generated a political dispute in the EU-Turkey relations is the 
July 15 coup attempt in Turkey in 2016 which marks the end of the analysis. The coup attempt 
represents another milestone for the EU-Turkey relations which needs a different analysis 
because it flamed the EU’s growing concerns on Turkey’s democratic status and accession 
negotiations. The ability of Turkey to deliver the necessary reforms for EU membership was 
completely damaged, especially by the state of emergency that was declared right after the 
coup attempt (Müftüler-Baç 2018). In addition, after the attempt was suppressed, the AKP 
government and Turkish President Erdoğan repeatedly expressed their resentment towards 
the EU and its member states for not showing their immediate support after the coup attempt. 
Even today, it is possible to observe such a discourse from the government elites and 
Erdoğan. They argue that only the government of the United Kingdom from the EU voiced 
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its explicit support to the AKP government. The contentions were furthered by both sides 
through the EP vote to suspend negotiations with Turkey and speculations of death penalty 
in Turkey.  
 
In this domestic political struggle, the already stagnated EU-Turkey relations deteriorated 
further over time. However, it is interesting to note that in the post-2013 period, the 
interactions between the EU and Turkey increased as the membership prospects for Turkey 
were sidelined. For instance, in December 2013, the initiation of the visa liberalization 
dialogue came months after the Gezi Park Protests, although it was not realized as of today. 
In the same year, the Readmission Deal was signed by both actors as a result of the challenges 
that emerged during the Syrian Civil War. Furthermore, the first EU-Turkey summit was 
held on November 2015. In 2016, there were two more summits, which focused mainly on 
the increasing flow of refugees and Turkey’s reception of the fund to support refugees. In 
addition, there were political dialogue meetings as well. Lastly, starting from 2014, the RAG 
meetings started to be held in Turkey to observe the political reforms. Overall, it could be 
concluded that there is an effort to increase the strategic cooperation between the EU and 
Turkey.  
 
The brief context that was presented above sets a background for the key arguments of this 
thesis. When the identity representations in the EU-Turkey relations are considered, there is 
again a rising trend in nationalist, populist, and Islamophobic sentiments in the EU (Kaya 
2018). Combined with the increasing strategic partnership without the prospect of 
membership in proximate sight, it might be beneficial to understand the post-2013 identity 
constructions through discourses. It would also be accurate, though, to state that these identity 
constructions are very much subject to change depending on the political incidents.  
 
Theoretically, the aforementioned events help and change the formation of identities under 
self-other conceptualizations that are extensively discussed by social constructivist scholars. 
In social constructivism, norms, rules, and identities are key (Wendt 1992). In this realm, 
states define their identities through their interactions with other states. States and non-state 
actors are considered to be the products of world politics and they actively shape it (Viotti & 
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Kauppi 2012). From this perspective, constructivist analyses of EU-Turkey relations are 
essential to comprehend the structures of identity and shared meanings.  
 
Guided by the relevant literature, the second chapter of this thesis will outline and expand 
the theoretical framework that was briefly introduced earlier. In relation to the theoretical 
framework, the choice of methodology will be introduced. This study will propose an attempt 
to apply DHA by analyzing the political speeches given by the MEPs. The specific focus on 
the EP will be justified through its’ increased powers especially in the enlargement policy of 
the EU. In addition, as a special international institution, the debates in the EP set the 
boundaries for the EU’s policies and in which the EU officials can act. Benefitting also from 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee  meetings between the EU and Turkey, this thesis aims at 
observing the agenda items that were discussed between 2013 and 2016.  Since the JPC 
meeting minutes are only available in the form of speech summaries, it is not possible to infer 
ideational constructs from them. The JPC meeting minutes, however, will be beneficial in 
showing the issue areas that were discussed between 2013 and 2016 and thus complementing 
the empirical analysis that will be done based on the speeches in the EP to observe the identity 
articulations.  
 
The following chapter will provide the general context in the EU-Turkey relations between 
1999 and 2013. Afterwards, the relevant literature that presents common ideational themes 
in the EU-Turkey relations will be provided. The literature that focuses on the period between 
1999 and 2013 will be observed to identify pre-existing ideational themes and turning points 
in the EU-Turkey relations. Based on the pre-2013 literature on identity constructions, the 
fourth chapter aims to analyze the shifts and continuities in discourses of identity between 
2013 and 2016 in the EU-Turkey relations. The final chapter will conclude with the findings 
and limitations of this thesis, which will pave the way for remarks for further research.   
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
In foreign policy analyses, numerous theoretical perspectives have been drawn and are in the 
making. As stated in the introduction, social constructivism is one of the theories that is 
beneficial for explaining foreign policy from an ideational perspective. In this chapter, 
constructivism and its relevance to this thesis will be elaborated as the preference of this 
particular theory will be justified.  
 
As a well-known international relations theory along with realism and liberalism, social 
constructivism gained prominence after the Cold War, when realism and liberalism fell short 
of anticipating the post-Cold War political atmosphere. The rise of neo-utilitarian approaches 
brought succinct empirical testing while creating some gaps. Social constructivism emerged 
to fill that gap through ideational analyses (Ruggie 1998). Taking the world as a constantly 
changing phenomena, social constructivism is rooted in both rationalistic and value-rational 
behavioral accounts. By prioritizing the importance of interpretations, social constructivism 
focuses on norms, rules, and identities (Wendt 1992). In their analyses, social constructivists 
do not limit themselves only to states. They also include transnational and international 
organizations (Viotti and Kauppi 2012). Thus, the EU, as it shows supranational and 
intergovernmental characteristics, and its relations with its members and candidate states are 
crucial for constructivist studies.  
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2.2. Social Constructivism 
 
 
After a brief introduction to social constructivism, we will move into its main premises and 
its relevance for this study. For constructivists, the agent-structure relationship is the central 
concern. For them, intersubjectivity, structures, rules, and norms are key terms (Viotti and 
Kauppi 2012). In this framework, identity holds a significant place in constructivist analyses. 
Social constructivism takes identity as a constructed concept which is contested by different 
actors. Through contestation, identity gains meaning in a self-other dichotomy. In other 
words, an actor gains its identity when it is recognized by other actors (Rumelili 2008). 
Actors observe each other through the identities that they attribute to one another (Hopf 
1998). In International Relations, one way that actors can attribute certain identities towards 
one another is through othering. Othering could be defined as the distance between the self 
and the other and in the literature, it is often constructed through negative and antagonistic 
relationships (Rumelili 2004; Morozov and Rumelili 2012).  
 
Neumann (1996) suggests that there are several scholars who study identity politics as a self-
other dichotomy. One is Michael J. Shapiro, who perceives foreign policy as all about 
creating an Other. In security studies, for instance, this dichotomous relationship has often 
been explored. David Campbell has explored how the United States tried to create an Other 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Neumann himself argues that self-other analyses 
would reveal the actors, the ways that they are constituted and the circumstances they may 
survive under. 
 
Constructivism also suggests that norms can also generate belongings to social communities 
(Risse 2004). The EU, for instance, is argued to represent an example of a social community 
that reflects a collective identity, based on universal principles in which member states extend 
their identities to other members (Habermas 2003; Kaina and Karolewski 2013). In European 
studies that follow a constructivist path, Europe is often defined with respect to others 
(Aydın-Düzgit 2013; Arkan 2016).  
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Considering EU’s relations with non-EU states, identities are constructed through the 
representations of “self” and “other” and they are in constant change, as evident in the EU-
Turkey relations (Rumelili 2004). The EU and Turkey position and shape their identities 
towards one another by interacting and establishing certain norms over time. As argued by 
the constructivist literature on the EU-Turkey relations, creation of a self-other dichotomy is 
essential for identity construction (Türkeş-Kılıç 2019). For this reason, in this study, identity 
is taken as a concept that might be analyzed relationally through difference and as an 
empirical concept that could be studied to understand the EU’s foreign policy (Rumelili and 
Cebeci 2016).  
 
As Arkan (2016) suggests, constructivism is concerned with the linkages between identity 
representations and policies. Constructivism perceives identity as a factor that shapes foreign 
policy through interactions. Thus, the EU’s foreign policy towards Turkey could be analyzed 
through its interactions with Turkey. Such interactions are reflected on individuals’ 
discourses. Analyzing ideational relationships through discourses is in line with the social 
constructivist thought because discourses are perceived as a way of representation which 
individuals utilize to describe the world (Aydın-Düzgit 2018). That is why, this thesis 
benefits from the discursive approaches to the ideational relationship between the EU and 
Turkey.  
 
Combining the relational and discursive outlooks based on social constructivism, this thesis 
will primarily look into the ways in which Turkey is being ideationally othered by the EU. 
Guided by the literature that explores the common ideational themes in the EU-Turkey 
relations, one of way of observing the ways in which Turkey is being othered by the EU is 
to look at the ideational themes of geography, culture, history, religion, civilization and 
democracy. Observing such ideational themes in a temporal dimension would provide the 
change in the EU’s ideational approach to Turkey. The key research question of this thesis 
focuses on whether the EU’s ideational perspectives on Turkey changed after 2013. If so, the 
thesis aims at exploring the ideational themes in the EU-Turkey relations that changed and 
continued to exist after 2013. 
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Based on the literature review for the period between 1999 and 2013, ideational themes that 
are mentioned above in the EU-Turkey relations will be presented. Throughout their long 
history, the EU and Turkey generated different ideational themes in relation to one another. 
Rumelili (2008), as an example, offers a succinct analysis on the EU-Turkey relations by 
arguing that the relations generate certain dichotomous identities, such as “Europe and Asia”; 
and “West and Islam”. Such ideational constructs will be observed under the themes of 
geography, culture and history. Culturally, for instance, Turkey is presented as the EU’s 
other, as she possesses Eastern cultural characteristics while the EU is the bearer of the 
European culture. Historically, for instance, Europe and the Ottoman Empire are coined in a 
long and violent relationship in which the Ottoman Empire is seen as a threat (Müftüler-Baç 
and Taşkın 2007). The discourse analysis will reveal whether these themes continue to exist 
between 2013 and 2016.   
 
Other relational themes could be grouped under religion and civilization. Although 
civilization could be perceived as a broad concept that includes geography, culture and 
history, it is most frequently being associated with religious identity constructions, as could 
be seen in the exemplary discourses provided by Rumelili (2008). For instance, as the former 
prime minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, and the former EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, suggests, Turkey’s accession to the EU would end the 
civilizational clash between the West and the Islamic World. At the same time, it would be 
wise to observe these concepts separately, as they could be used on their own as a way of 
othering Turkey. Turkey, for instance, by challenging the European identity with repetitive 
accusations of being a “Christian Club”, causes the EU to include Christianity in its identity 
(Rumelili 2008) and redefine its roles regarding multiculturalism. Similarly, Turkey and the 
EU represent two different civilizations that are built relationally (Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın 
2007). Turkey’s accession process increased the EU’s concerns on whether these two 
different civilizations could be reconciled.  
 
The final theme to be observed is the democratic and territorial disputes. Starting from 2007, 
the literature suggests that Turkey started to be seen as a candidate country that has 
democratic and territorial disputes and thus, cannot meet the European norms (Çarkoğlu 
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2007; Oğuzlu 2012). Considering that the EU’s core identity includes democracy (Rumelili 
2008), Turkey’s diverging path from democracy leads her to be othered by the EU. However, 
conventional/liberal constructivists argue that the EU’s core identity, including democracy, 
is not formed in relation to others, as it is taken to be an internal process. On the other hand, 
critical constructivists argue that collective identities of states are formed in a self-other nexus 
(Rumelili and Cebeci 2016). For this reason, this thesis obtains the latter approach when 
analyzing democracy and territorial disputes as ideational themes in which Turkey is being 
othered by the EU. The analysis covering the period between 2013 and 2016 will reveal 
whether the EU uses Turkey’s democratic and territorial disputes as a tool to position Turkey 
as the other.  
 
Before moving on with the next chapter, it is beneficial to refer to some contemporary and 
critical examples of constructivist analyses of the EU-Turkey relations, as there are emerging 
analyses that are critical towards social constructivism. For instance, Rumelili and Cebeci 
(2016) provide a new insight to the constructivist debates on European identity. They focus 
on the evolution of constructivist approaches to European identity. With its recent internal 
and external challenges, European identity started to be questioned and re-constructed 
through certain dualities, such as national and European; and internal and external. To be 
able to construct a thorough analysis, they suggest other theoretical lenses to be harmonized 
with constructivism, such as poststructuralism which experienced an increase in EU studies. 
As it is argued in this thesis, discursive studies could be beneficial for that harmonization. 
 
Finally, it could be argued that studies that apply discursive approaches are currently 
increasing. Theoretically, Aydın-Düzgit (2014) suggests that CDA is more in line with social 
constructivist thought, as they both seek for causality behind discourses and incidents. At the 
beginning of Chapter 3, this thesis aims at presenting a general overview of the incidents that 
took place in the EU-Turkey relations which could have an impact on the construction of 
ideational themes in discourses. Moreover, CDA proposes a social reality besides discourses 
by separating what is discursive and non-discursive (Aydın-Düzgit and Rumelili 2018). That 
is why, the next section aims at introducing a type of CDA, DHA, which will be used in the 
analysis part of this thesis.  
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2.3. Methodology 
 
 
As mentioned earlier in the thesis, one way of analyzing foreign policy is through studying 
discourses. In general, discourse analysis is usually regarded as a method of linguistics. 
However, discourses are now treated as more than language use. With the emergence of 
CDA, language is seen to be a “social practice” by “critical linguists” who are influenced by 
the Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. (Wodak 2001b). For instance, focusing on 
discourses could help one to capture social issues and the relationship between power and 
politics (Herrera and Braumoeller 2004; Hopf 2004). Thus, context is highly relevant for 
discourse analysis. In relation to this thesis, speeches given by the MEPs on Turkey are 
expected to reveal the shifts in discourses of identity, as well as uncovering current tensions 
and issues of contention between Turkey and the EU by benefitting from discourse analytic 
methods.   
 
As a type of CDA, DHA is the primary method that is used in this study. DHA diverges from 
CDA with its focus on identity and discursive constructions as “us” and “them” (Aydın-
Düzgit 2014). There are several reasons for this choice of method. Firstly, there is not yet 
much emphasis in the literature on the EU-Turkey relations from a discursive perspective 
that aims to observe the shifts in discourses of identity over Turkey’s membership bid, though 
the discursive methods are gaining attention. Thus, this study aims to contribute to the gap 
in discourse analytic studies on the EU-Turkey relations. Secondly, by applying DHA, this 
study tries to benefit from social constructivism. In addition, DHA is argued to be suitable 
for studies that observes identity constructions (Aydın-Düzgit 2014).  
 
One critical point to be addressed at this point should concern the suitability of social 
constructivism and DHA. DHA is known for connecting discursive incidents with their 
societal and political histories which are essential for social constructivism. As this thesis 
adopts the approach of constructivism, background information of the incidents will be 
provided along with their relevance to their context. In this thesis, constructions of European 
identity through Turkey’s membership bid between 2013-2016 is the primary focus.  
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The temporal dimension of this thesis might lead to key findings in relation to discourses. 
The period between 2013 and 2016 is crucial primarily because of the context of the critical 
voices that were raised by the EU. In this period, it could be argued that normative and 
identity-based approaches slowly yielded themselves to strategic ones, although they were 
still vibrant. In addition, concerns on Turkey’s diverging path from democracy started to be 
raised much often. Strategic partnership and differentiated integration were being discussed 
more frequently.  
 
Table 2.1 Discursive Strategies 
Strategy Objectives Devices 
Referential / nomination Construction of in-groups and out-
groups 
• Membership categorization 
• Biological, naturalizing and 
depersonalizing metaphors 
and metonymies 
• Synecdoches  
Predication Labelling social actors more or less 
positively or negatively, deprecatorily 
or appreciatively  
• Stereotypical, evaluative 
attributions of negative or 
positive traits 
• Implicit and explicit 
predicates 
Argumentation Justification of positive or negative 
attributions 
• Topoi used to justify 
political inclusion or 
exclusion, discrimination or 
preferential treatment 
Perspectivation, framing 
or discourse 
representation 
Expressing involvement  
Positioning speaker’s point of view 
• Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation of 
(discriminatory) events and 
utterances 
Intensification, 
mitigation 
Modifying the epistemic status of a 
proposition 
• Intensifying or mitigating the 
illocutionary force of 
(discriminatory) utterances 
 
Source: Wodak, Ruth. 2001a. “The discourse-historical approach.” in Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. London: Sage.  
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This thesis will follow three steps to apply DHA. As Wodak (2001a) identifies, these steps 
are named as the identification of “discourse topics”, “discursive strategies”, and “linguistic 
means”. In this thesis, discourse topics refer to the repeating themes in discourses of EU 
politicians. As expected, they will revolve around debates on Turkey’s integration and EU’s 
partnership with Turkey. Secondly, discursive strategies, as indicated in Table 2.1, are crucial 
because they involve multiple questions to be dealt with. Wodak establishes five strategies, 
that are: “referential/nomination”, “predication”, “argumentation”, “perspectivation, framing 
/ discourse representation” and “intensification, mitigation”. Referential / nomination 
strategies are concerned with the constructions of in-groups and out-groups. Predication 
strategies observe the labels given to social actors. Argumentation strategies look at how 
positive or negative attributions are justified by using different topoi, which are 
argumentation parts that link the arguments with conclusions. Perspectivation, framing / 
discourse representation strategies reveal the speaker’s level of involvement. Finally, 
intensification, mitigation strategies observe any modifications of the epistemic status of a 
proposition. The third and final step would be on linguistic means that refer to metaphors, 
creation of ingroups, and the like. Overall, these three steps will be sought in the discourses 
indicated in this study. 
 
Another aspect of DHA to be included in the analysis is DHA’s concepts of “intertextuality” 
and “interdiscursivity” (Wodak 2001a). Unlike poststructuralist analyses, DHA differentiates 
between the two. Intertextuality is sought when a particular text carries certain themes and 
elements from other texts, whereas interdiscursivity refers to the when a discourse refers to 
certain elements in another discourse. To illustrate both in relation to this thesis, 
intertextuality could be visible when a MEP, while giving a speech on Turkey’s accession, 
takes certain themes from another speech given by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement. 
Meanwhile, interdiscursivity could be visible when a certain MEP refers to the headscarf 
debate in Turkey while speaking about freedom of expression.   
 
As presented, the application of DHA to the texts that are picked from MEPs’ speeches is 
done through the aforementioned three steps by observing intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity. To note a shortcoming of this thesis, it is vital to include that most 
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parliamentary speeches on the website of the EP are not in English in the transcribed format. 
Thus, the videos of the speeches had to be viewed to hear the direct translations of the 
speeches that are not in English. After transcribing the speeches, the speeches were 
categorized based on their ideational themes and the party groups that utilize them. To add 
another detail about the transcription process, it should be added that written appeals in the 
parliament were also omitted from the analysis because their translated versions are not 
available. 
 
Given this methodological ground, this thesis starts to outline the literature on identity 
constructions in the EU-Turkey relations between 1999 and 2013. In Chapter 4, the analysis 
of this thesis will cover the period between 2013 and 2016. The analysis will observe 18 EP 
debates and 1024 individual speeches (Table 2.3) on Turkey’s accession starting from the 
first meeting during the Gezi Park Protests on June 2013 and ending with the last meeting on 
June 2016 before the July 15 coup attempt in 2016. The debates on Turkey were retrieved 
through the website of the EP. For the debates between 2013-2016, the first parliamentary 
term from 2009 to 2014, starting from 2013, was used. From the second parliamentary term 
between 2014 to 2019, the debates between 2014 and 2016 were retrieved (European 
Parliament, n.d.). There are two parliamentary debates on Turkey in 2013, three in 2014, five 
in 2015, and eight in 2016. After July 15, it is possible to point out that ideational studies on 
the EU-Turkey relations ceased to exist, as did the membership prospects for Turkey. The 
relations came to a point of full stagnation when the EP voted to suspend negotiations with 
Turkey (Müftüler-Baç 2018). Considering the impact of the incidents in 2013 on the shifts 
in discourses of identity in the EU-Turkey relations, this study aims to examine the reflection 
of ideational constructs in the EP discourses as the relations stagnate and deteriorate.  
 
One crucial reason behind the selection of parliamentary debates for this analysis lies in the 
literature as well as the EU’s founding treaties when the EU’s external relations are 
considered. For instance, Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (EUR-Lex, n.d.) 
emphasizes the EU’s relations with neighboring countries. Moreover, in Article 8, a special 
importance is attached to the values and norms of the Union. The EP is the institution of the 
EU in which such values and norms are being debated. In addition, being the EU’s institution, 
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which is directly elected by the people, it has key legislative, budgetary and supervisory 
powers. As will be mentioned further, the EP, not being a typical parliament with its qualities 
and powers, is a special institution in which identity articulations could be observed the most.  
 
There is a growing emphasis on the role of parliaments in foreign policy making. Similarly, 
international parliaments, such as the EP, are of crucial significance when the enlargement 
procedure of the EU is concerned. This line of argument is different from the conventional 
view that sidelines the roles of international parliaments (Slaughter 2004). As the emerging 
literature suggests, the empowerment of the EP changed its’ relations with national 
parliaments. Depending on how national parliaments perceive the EP, either as a competitor 
or an ally, the EP may either push national parliaments to obtain extra powers at the national 
level or deter them from doing so (Winzen et al. 2015). On the other hand, Haroche (2018) 
argues that the EP empowerment could be seen as a threat to national parliamentarians when 
their policy preferences do not match. Thus, the international structure of the EP and the 
powers it gradually gained changed its’ relations with national parliaments.  
 
As an international parliament, the EP also gradually gained prominent powers compared to 
other EU institutions.  For instance, the “assent procedure”, which is currently known as the 
“consent procedure”, that was firstly brought by the Single European Act in 1986, provides 
the EP with the power to veto an acceding state (Aydın-Düzgit 2015a). Furthermore, the 
Treaty on the European Union provided the EP with crucial powers on the financial side of 
enlargement, allowing the EP to influence the amounts given to the Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance. Finally, the EP’s rapporteurs for candidate countries can influence the 
European Commission’s country reports (De Munter 2019). As a result, the EP currently has 
a strong leverage in the enlargement procedure.  
 
Besides the EP’s powers in the enlargement procedure, the literature suggests that 
parliamentary debates carry high formal authority and are revealing in terms of identity 
constructions (Aydın-Düzgit 2014; Hansen 2006). However, there are recent critical studies 
on the role of the EP which suggest that the EP’s image in “target countries”, such as Turkey, 
are in decline (Gürkan 2018). However, upon examining the MEP speeches, this thesis argues 
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that they are beneficial for this study because of their identity articulations that are both under 
high political authority and public scrutiny. The MEPs can influence the enlargement 
procedure through informal deliberations with the representatives from the EC and the 
Commission (Aydın-Düzgit 2015a). Combined with the EP’s strong powers in the 
enlargement procedure, examining the MEP speeches might reflect the EU’s ideational 
perspective on Turkey. By doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by putting 
emphasis on the EP as an influencer in and representative of identity politics.    
 
The EP also has certain powers considering EU’s foreign policy. Though the EP’s powers 
are limited, it holds the right to be informed and consulted about the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. In addition, the EP has budgetary powers that can shape the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (Turunen 2019). Moreover, the EP is involved in inter-
institutional discussions with the European Commission.  
 
Observing the speeches of the MEPs can also reflect the ideological stances of their party 
groups on Turkey. As seen in Table 2.2, there are different party groups in the EP that vary 
in size (Figure 2.1) and they represent different political orientations. The political 
orientations of the MEPs are crucial to consider because they reflect the boundaries in which 
the EU officials can act. In addition, their political orientations could be perceived on a left-
right dimension, as it is the case in national parliaments (Hix et al. 2005). On the left side of 
the political spectrum, there are GUE-NGL, Greens-EFA and S&D. GUE-NGL, which has 
been the fifth largest party group since 1989, has far-left, Eurosceptic, anti-austerity and anti-
capitalist political views. Greens-EFA was founded in 1999, preceded by The Green Group 
and European Radical Alliance. Greens-EFA has a left-wing, environmentalist and 
regionalist agenda. Its number of seats in the EP have been very close the GUE-NGL’s 
number of seats. The S&D group, founded in 1953, is the second largest party group in the 
EP since 1999 and is at the center-left, bearing socialist tendencies. ALDE, which was 
founded in 2004, could be placed at the center with its liberal agenda, being the third largest 
party group in the EP until 2014. ALDE was preceded by the European Liberal Democrat 
and Reform Party. 
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Table 2.2 Political orientation of the party groups in the 7th and 8th EP 
2014-2019 
8th European Parliament 
2009-2014  
7th European Parliament 
 
Political orientation 
European United Left-Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL) 
European United Left-Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL) 
Far-left, Eurosceptic, Anti-
austerity, Anti-capitalist 
Greens-European Free Alliance 
(Greens-EFA) 
Greens-European Free Alliance 
(Greens-EFA) 
Left-wing, Environmentalist, 
Regionalist 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D) 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D) 
Center-left, Socialist 
Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 
Centrist-Liberal 
European People’s Party (EPP) European People’s Party (EPP) Center-right, Christian Democrat 
and Conservatives 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) 
Center-right, Conservative, Anti-
federal, Eurosceptic 
Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) 
Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy (EFD) 
 
Right-wing, Conservative, 
Eurosceptic  Europe of Nations and Freedom 
(ENF) 
 
Non-Affiliated Members (NI) Non-Affiliated Members (NI) Various 
 
Source: Türkeş-Kılıç, Selin. 2019. “Justifying privileged partnership with Turkey: an 
analysis of debates in the European Parliament.” Turkish Studies. p. 10.  
 
On the right side of the political spectrum, there are EPP, ECR, EFDD and ENF. EPP, which 
holds most of the seats at the parliament since 1999 (Figure 2.1), is a center-right political 
group that is made up of Christian democrats and conservatists. It was founded in 1976. ECR 
is relatively a new party group that was founded in 2009 and has anti-federal and Eurosceptic 
tendencies. ECR quickly became the fourth and third largest party group respectively. 
Finally, EFDD and ENF share similar political orientations that are close to the right-wing, 
conservatism and Euroscepticism. EFDD was founded in 2014 and ENF was founded in 
2015. Besides Non-Inscrits, both parties had the lowest number of seats in the EP. Finally, it 
is also possible to point out that Non-Inscrits almost had the same number of seats in the EP 
as EFDD and ENF.  
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Figure 2.1 Percentages of total seats in the European Parliament 
Source: European Parliament: Facts and Figures. April 2018. 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614733/EPRS_BRI(2018)614
733_EN.pdf 
 
After providing information on the party groups that were present in the EP between 2013 
and 2016, we can now provide a basic description of the dataset of the analysis. The dataset 
contains 1024 speeches and as visible in Table 2.3, those speeches that are observed between 
2013 and 2016 in the EP during the debates on Turkey are distributed among different party 
groups. The table also contains the number of speeches given by the representatives of the 
other EU institutions, the European Commission and the EC. Those speeches by the EU 
institutions’ leaders are crucial to observe in the analysis because they might contain identity 
articulations regarding the EU and Turkey as well.  
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Table 2.3 Number of speeches given by the party groups and representatives of EU 
institutions 
Party Groups Number of speeches 
European Commission 25 
European Council 20 
GUE/NGL 86 
Greens & EFA 68 
S&D 218 
ALDE 90 
EPP 203 
ECR 124 
EFDD 68 
ENF 58 
NI 64 
Total 1024 
 
It is not only the EP in which it is possible to observe the general climate in the EU-Turkey 
relations in a parliamentary setting. Another parliamentary body that is crucial in the EU-
Turkey relations is the EU-Turkey JPC, which was established in 1965 to support Turkey’s 
transition to democracy. This committee includes members from the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and the EP. The committee allows one to observe the agenda items that are being 
discussed in the EU-Turkey relations. For instance, Scotti (2016) argues that the committee 
mainly focuses on the Kurdish issue, the status of minorities, the Cyprus issue and the role 
of religion. A closer look at the meetings between 2013 and 2016 would guide the analysis 
by revealing other items that were discussed. As stated in the Introduction, however, it is not 
possible to observe identity constructions through the speeches of the MEPs because the JPC 
meeting minutes are only available in speech summaries. Thus, in the empirical part of the 
thesis, the agenda items that were discussed in JPC meetings between 2013 and 2016 will 
complement the identity constructions in MEPs’ speeches.  
 
In the period between the Gezi Park Protests and July 15 coup attempt, there were five JPC 
meetings. Right after the Gezi Park Protests began, the committee convened for its 72nd 
meeting (European Parliament 2013a). Along with some emphasis on the protests, the Syrian 
crisis was widely being discussed. The Kurdish issue and the Cyprus issue were also included 
in the debate. Those issues were discussed in the 73rd meeting as well, which took place 
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towards the end of 2013. In the 74th meeting on April 2014, such issues were replaced by the 
issues concerning the rule of law and the independence of judiciary in Turkey, following the 
December 2013 corruption investigations. Towards the end of 2014, the 75th meeting had an 
agenda that combined all the aforementioned agenda items except the Gezi Park Protests. On 
March 2015, the committee convened for its 76th meeting. In the meeting, unresolved issues 
regarding customs union and visa liberalization were discussed. With the rise of Islamic State 
in 2015, the debate focused on combatting Islamic State in particular. Until April 2018, no 
other committee meetings were held. In general, Turkey’s democratic and territorial disputes 
were frequently discussed between 2013 and 2016, as well as the regional challenges faced 
by Turkey and the EU.  
 
Before moving on further with the thesis, it is beneficial to mention about one methodological 
issue. When trying to infer from party groups’ ideological stances, representativeness arises 
as a critical issue. It would not be a thorough analysis to assume uniform positions for party 
groups, as they are heterogenous (Türkeş-Kılıç 2019). Similarly, it would be even harder to 
assume a uniform stance on an ideational issue towards Turkey. On the other hand, the EP 
debates allow the representation of people from different nationalities and political opinions, 
which assure public scrutiny. In addition, the EP also allows to observe speeches given by 
the presidents of EU institutions, the EP, European Commission and EC (Levin 2011). Thus, 
this thesis aims to cover discourses from different party groups and provide different and 
common discursive themes in the speeches of MEPs. Speeches that share similar ideational 
tropes will be presented in the footnotes to point out to the shared discursive elements on 
Turkey. In light of the aforementioned theoretical framework and methodology, next chapter 
will reflect the ideational themes that were prevalent between 1999 and 2013.  
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3. IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS IN PRE-2013 EU-TURKEY RELATIONS 
 
 
 
EU-Turkey relations between 1999 and 2013 have numerous milestones and turning points 
that had an impact on identity constructions. To be able to observe the literature during this 
period and come up with ideational themes from the literature, a prior overview of the events 
that occurred in the relations is beneficial to relate the themes with context, as social 
constructivism and DHA necessitates.  
 
Needless to repeat, 1999 is the year in which Turkey’s candidacy was recognized in Helsinki. 
At the time, Turkey was led by a coalition government made up of three political parties. 
Bülent Ecevit was the prime minister, accompanied by İsmail Cem, the foreign minister. The 
government enacted democratic reforms paving the way for EU membership (Öniş 2016). 
Ecevit’s statement following Turkey’s candidacy reflected a strong belief in Turkey’s EU 
membership in the short term (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). 
 
Towards the end of the coalition government, Turkey persisted towards EU membership. 
During the early 2000s, important milestones paved the way for Turkey’s accession, such as 
the adoption of the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership in 2001 by the EC. In the same year, 
the EC decided to increase EU’s financial support to Turkey (Delegation of the European 
Union to Turkey 2019). There were other factors that accelerated Turkey’s path to the EU. 
The Turkish parliament enacted the reform that abolished the death penalty in 2002 except 
for war times, which was a reform that was highly praised by the EU. The European 
Commission viewed this initiative as a positive move towards becoming a “full-fledged 
democracy” (BBC News 2004).  
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At the same time, however, Turkey was going through political tensions, as the Turkish 
Constitutional Court banned FP (BBC News 2018). The EU voiced its concerns regarding 
Turkish democracy (Amerika’nın Sesi 2001). The FP was the continuation of RP, which had 
been banned in 1998. Both parties shared the same ideological roots in religion and their 
approach to democracy and foreign policy. Interestingly, FP differed from the RP in its 
perception of the EU as the representative of universal democratic values, which would later 
be echoed by AKP (Tanıyıcı 2003). Given such a background, Turkey’s elections in 
November 2002 that ended the decade-long period of coalition governments changed both 
Turkish politics and EU-Turkey relations. Turkey’s acceleration towards EU membership 
that had started in 1999 took a faster path after the election of the AKP government.  
 
One of the very early reforms AKP initiated in 2003 to drive Turkey towards EU membership 
was on freedom of speech, Kurdish language rights, and the political role of military 
(Müftüler-Baç 2005). These issues represent other recurring themes for identity 
constructions, as they will become more visible in the post-2013 analysis. Despite these 
reforms, there were incompatibilities between some EU member states and Turkey. For 
instance, on her visit to Turkey, the former leader of the main opposition party in Germany, 
Angela Merkel, who would later become the Chancellor, expressed her concerns in 2004 
regarding Turkey’s EU membership, offering “privileged partnership” as an alternative. 
Privileged partnership would later be offered as an alternative yet unclear way that neither 
risks EU’s strategic ties with Turkey nor accepts Turkey as an EU member (Ulusoy 2014).  
 
The privileged partnership offers were rejected by the former prime minister Erdoğan. Most 
importantly, in the meeting with Merkel, Erdoğan argued that AKP does not perceive the EU 
as a “Christian Club”, although the EU has to include Turkey to prove that it is not a Christian 
Club (Deutsche Welle 2004). By referring to a religious ideational construct, Turkey tried to 
pressure the EU to accept her as a member. Nevertheless, Merkel repeated her offer in several 
occasions after she became the Chancellor of Germany. As could be observed, alternative 
forms of integration were already being voiced even before the accession negotiations, along 
with religious themes (Dağı 2005).  
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Regardless of Germany’s opposition to Turkey’s full membership, on December 2004, it was 
decided that Turkey’s accession negotiations would start the following year on October 2005, 
marking it as another crucial milestone in the EU-Turkey relations. Until 2007, AKP steered 
its attempt to increase democratic reforms in the realm of its ambitious EU membership 
process. As Öniş (2015) describes the 2002-2007 period as the AKP’s golden age, it could 
be suggested that Turkey had economic growth, increasing presence in its neighborhood by 
establishing ties with several countries, and relative stability in the issues regarding minority 
rights, trying to reconstruct Turkey’s former identity in the eyes of the EU. 
 
Two incidents that occurred in 2005 came as a major shock to the EU’s identity and 
integration project. The European Constitutional Treaty, defined as the second big initiative 
of the EU after the 2004 enlargement, was rejected by referenda in two of the founding 
countries of the EU, the Netherlands and France. On both sides, Turkey’s accession to the 
EU was used by the opposition to encourage national identities instead of the EU (Taggart 
2006). Thus, this incident revealed the ideational tensions within the EU, which was 
strengthened by the accession negotiations of Turkey.  
 
Around the same period, Cyprus started to become a major issue of contention that also have 
ideational implications for the EU-Turkey relations, which damaged the EU’s positive image 
of Turkey’s religious and civilizational difference. Cyprus became an EU member in 2004 
right after the failed referendum on the United Nation’s Annan Plan. As the referendum 
envisioned, if there was a reunification, the whole island of Cyprus would have become an 
EU member. Nevertheless, the Northern Cyprus was left out while Cyprus became an EU 
member (Kirişçi and Toygür 2019). In 2006, contrary to what the Additional Protocol 
required, Turkey did not extend her ports and airports to the Greek Cypriot Administration 
of Southern Cyprus. Thus, eight chapters of the acquis could not be opened (Republic of 
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for EU Affairs 2017). As a result, Cyprus 
emerges to be another issue to be sought in the post-2013 analysis because it was applied to 
Turkey under the “good neighborly relations criterion”. This increased the concerns that even 
if Turkey democratizes, she would remain as a candidate state that has territorial disputes 
with an EU member (Saatçioğlu 2009).  
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Towards 2007, combined with the issues related to Cyprus, the relations stagnated when AKP 
had its domestic struggles and economic troubles following the 2007-08 global financial 
crisis. Primarily, on April 2007, the Turkish military published an e-memorandum claiming 
that AKP departed from secularism during the parliamentary sessions to elect the president. 
After Abdullah Gül was nominated by the AKP as its presidential candidate, despite the 
ongoing EU reforms, the Turkish military signaled a possible military intervention (Warhola 
and Bezci 2010). Furthermore, the constitutional referendum later in the same year 
introduced the public vote to elect the president. Afterwards, the main opposition party CHP 
applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court in 2008 for AKP’s closure, sharing the e-
memorandum’s claims. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal by a small margin, 
although it was the second major challenge AKP faced. It could be suggested that AKP 
became the new dominant center party after it passed these challenges, though EU’s concerns 
regarding Turkish democracy and secularism surpassed other ideational themes such as 
geography, culture, history, religion and civilization, that were mentioned earlier (Çarkoğlu 
2007; Oğuzlu 2012).  
 
During Turkey’s accession negotiations and domestic struggles, another round of 
enlargement took place in the EU. As of January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU. 
Both countries had eleven and twelve years of accession negotiations, respectively. One of 
the major implications of this enlargement was that Turkey’s two neighbors in her western 
border was now EU member states. This enlargement round had another implication which 
concerns the EU. From the perception of the EU, certain EU member states such as Poland 
and Czech Republic saw Romania and Bulgaria as “less-European” (Rumelili 2008). Within 
the central and eastern member states, this became a prominent identity issue for the EU. 
This type of “othering” was also visible towards Turkey, especially after 2007.  
 
In 2007, Turkey began to face opposition from certain EU member states, more specifically 
from France and Austria. When public opinion surveys and government discourses are 
examined, Austria has always been recognized by her opposition to Turkey’s membership 
(Lindgaard 2018). France, during former president Nicolas Sarkozy’s incumbency, expressed 
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strong criticisms to Turkey’s possible membership. Besides suggesting Turkey as a 
geographically non-European country (Morozov and Rumelili 2012), Sarkozy also lobbied 
to prevent opening new chapters with Turkey (Bilefsky 2007). 
 
Despite opposition, Turkey and the EU managed to open four new chapters in 2008. The EU 
also acknowledged Turkey to be a functioning market economy (European Commission 
2008). However, the relations gradually stagnated after 2009. In 2009, only two chapters 
could be opened and only one in 2010. In 2009, Cyprus unilaterally blocked six Chapters. 
Until 2015, these six Chapters did not have any negotiations over them. The growing 
literature on AKP’s dominancy and authoritarian tendencies are crucial to comprehend 
Turkey’s growing distance with the EU (Ertuğrul and Yılmaz 2017; Esen and Gumuscu 2016; 
Haferlach, Tekin and Wódka 2018). As Öniş (2016) suggests, between 2007 and 2011, the 
AKP’s consolidation of power was realized through the marginalization of the military and 
judiciary. In addition, both the EU and Turkey started to have economic issues following the 
financial crisis that started as of 2007-08. Identity-based issues were also prevalent in 
financial debates. For instance, in the EU, negative representations of identity between 
creditor and debtor member states challenged the collective European identity (Kaygusuz 
2018; Rumelili and Cebeci 2016).  
 
Other political developments that took place in Turkey from 2010 to 2013 are crucial in 
understanding Turkey’s growing distance with the EU as well. Issues regarding the status of 
minorities in Turkey, particularly the Kurdish issue, gradually became an obstacle preventing 
the EU-Turkey relations from moving further. The “Kurdish initiative” that was launched in 
2009 and the constitutional referendum in 2010 were positive developments that were 
welcomed by the EU. The Kurdish initiative went in parallel with the “Oslo talks” which 
involved negotiations between the Turkish government and Kurdish representatives. 
However, the Oslo talks broke down as of 2010, accompanied by PKK attacks, Turkish 
opposition parties’ criticisms, and arrests (CNN Türk 2014a).  
The issues in Turkey considering the role of the military and judiciary are also significant in 
relation to Turkey’s democratic status and her accession to the EU. The referendum in 2010 
that aimed to bring parliamentary control over the military and judiciary was a crucial 
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incident that helped democracy as an ideational theme to be reconstructed.  As the 
referendum was approved by the people, Štefan Füle, the former European Commissioner 
for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, welcomed the results of the 
referendum. However, after the 2017 referendum, there would be differing retrospective 
opinions regarding whether the 2010 referendum was the predecessor of the one in 2017 that 
enabled AKP to steer Turkey towards a presidential system, thus, a more authoritarian regime 
(Hamsici, 2017). 
 
2011 marks the year as the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and the refugee crisis that 
would later turn into a serious challenge against Turkey and the EU, among many other 
countries. With the surge of the Arab Spring, the southern neighborhood of both actors was 
subject to significant change. The Turkish government shifted its foreign policy towards the 
Middle East and North Africa with hopes of leading the Islamic world at the international 
arena by supporting the uprisings (Kirişçi and Toygür 2019). Moreover, Turkey openly 
expressed her support to the opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and enabled the 
FSA to organize in Turkey (Özbek 2018). Thus, as a neighboring country, Turkey was 
actively involved in the Syrian conflict since the beginning of the first incidents.  
 
The EU took certain measures against Syria as well, by imposing sanctions on the Syrian 
president Assad (BBC News 2011), freezing the draft Association Agreement and 
suspending bilateral cooperation programs (European Union External Action Service 2016). 
In the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey (European Commission 2011), little emphasis was 
given to the issue, while Turkey’s humanitarian efforts were recognized. However, the EU 
stated that Turkey was not aligned with the EU’s measures against Syria, leading to the 
divergence of interests in foreign policy. In addition, Turkey’s active involvement in Syria 
and its relations with non-state armed forces, such as FSA, brought exclusivist discourses in 
the EP in which Turkey was accused of cooperating with terrorist organizations.  
 
Coming back to the EU-Turkey relations in particular, the effect of multiple issues in the EU-
Turkey relations was visible in the accession negotiations. There was no progress regarding 
opening new chapters in 2011 and 2012. Nevertheless, identity constructions by the EU 
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leaders were not exclusionary. In 2011, for instance, the former EU Commission president 
Barroso expressed his opinion that regarded Turkey as an asset to the EU because of her 
young population and dynamism, while recognizing that there were opposing member states 
(Aras and Akdoğan 2017).  
 
The general overview of the period between 1999 and 2013 reveals significant deterioration 
of the relations especially after 2007. The incidents that took place between the EU and 
Turkey are crucial to comprehend the ways in which identity constructions are formed. In 
the light of the literature, the next chapter aims to observe the period between 1999 and 2013 
in EU-Turkey relations according to different identity representations. In each section, it is 
possible to refer to the common ideational themes in the literature which are based on the 
aforementioned events that have taken place between the EU and Turkey. The first section 
covers the ideational themes of geography, culture and history. The following section sheds 
light on religion and civilization. The final section has more emphasis on democracy and 
territorial disputes.  
 
 
3.1.  Turkey as the Geographical, Cultural and Historical Other 
 
 
EU-Turkey relations between 1999 and 2013 might be better explained through a 
presentation of the literature that reflects identity constructions in this period. The factual 
focus will be on the identity constructions in Europe towards Turkey. The EU’s approach 
towards Turkey has historically been shaped by the ways the EU constructs its identity. 
However, it would not be a thorough analysis if European identity construction is considered 
in isolation. As will be shown in more detail in the post-2013 analysis, the EU’s constructions 
of identity is shaped by the events that occur in Turkey. Thus, in the pre-2013 study of themes 
of identity, it is vital to refer to the initial stages after Turkey’s candidacy was granted to the 
EU. 
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Around 1999, the excitement of Turkey on becoming a candidate to the EU was not 
necessarily echoed by the EU. As Levin (2011) suggests, exclusivist definitions of Europe 
increased in parliamentary speeches around 1999. The EP did not have a positive image of 
Turkey, considering the gender roles, human rights, democracy and religion in Turkey. The 
unsettled headscarf debates and minority rights issues led the EP to link Turkey with 
suppressive human rights applications. Contrary to liberal / social democrat MEPs, who were 
the proponents of Turkey’s membership, opposing groups used exclusivist discourses such 
as “dangerous” and “threat”, based on geographical, cultural and historical constructions of 
identity. For instance, in an EU member state, such as France, exclusionary discourses could 
be noticed based on geography, culture, and history (Tekin 2010). The same could be argued 
for Germany (Yılmaz 2007).   
 
To start with the theme of geography, it is possible to argue that Turkey is seen as a Middle 
Eastern or an Asian country that does not belong to Europe (Türkeş-Kılıç 2019). Very much 
in relation to the civilizational discourses that would be argued later, Europe is 
geographically constructed as a civilization (Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın 2007). However, as 
civilization is often associated with religious connotations, it would be beneficial to observe 
religious and civilizational constructions of identity together in the next section. The EU, as 
an organization that bears supranational characteristics, is subjected to several attempts to 
create fixed borders for Europe. As the EU enlarged towards Central Europe and Balkans, 
the fixed borders of Europe also enlarged. The way the borders of Europe was defined 
changed and started to include new cultural bonds, such as “kinship” (Sjursen 2002).  
 
Being the EU’s largest enlargement up to that date, known as “The Big Bang Enlargement”, 
ten countries became EU member states. Retrospectively, Germany was in favor of this 
enlargement, considering the security of its larger neighborhood against Russia’s influence 
in the region. A second factor behind Germany’s support could be “kinship”. Germany could 
have perceived welcoming the countries in the 2004 enlargement as a historical obligation 
because of Europe’s distant relations with them in the past. Some member states were not as 
welcoming as Germany, such as France, as she prioritized their power and influence within 
the EU. Nevertheless, as Schimmelfennig (2001; 2003) suggests, European states have used 
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norms to pursue their interests (Aydın-Düzgit 2015b). However, the literature is not certain 
whether the same could be applied to the Turkish case, in which othering and inclusion were 
processed together. 
 
Overall, it could be suggested that Turkey was mostly excluded and perceived to be different 
on cultural grounds as a non-European country (Müftüler-Baç 2000). Culturally, Europe is 
defined as an entity that has a shared culture. Turkey is argued to have a hybrid culture, 
nourished by Eastern and Western cultural characteristics (Morozov and Rumelili 2012). 
However, Turkey’s cultural identity is seen as incompatible with European cultural identity 
because of Europe’s roots in “ancient Greece, Christianity and the Enlightenment” (Müftüler-
Baç 2000). Such cultural constructions of identity that carry religious and civilizational 
underpinnings will be elaborated further.  
 
Finally, the way the EU constructs Europeanness and Turkishness also carries a historical 
background that could be traced back to the relations between Europe and the Ottoman 
Empire. The literature suggests that especially with the AKP government, as a “post-
Islamist” movement (Dağı 2005; Rumelili 2008), Turkey tried to reconstruct her identity that 
has its roots both in Europe and the Ottoman Empire, trying to reflect her hybrid character 
that was mentioned earlier. Historically, the Ottoman Empire was ideationally constructed as 
the “dominant Other” that could pose a threat to Europe (Müftüler-Baç 2000). In addition, 
the representations of the Ottoman Empire were coined with “barbarism” while Europe was 
associated with civilization (Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın 2007). However, with the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the founders and the governments that followed 
them tried to establish a pro-Western outlook while establishing alliances.  
 
As could be observed in this section, the literature argues that Turkey is the EU’s 
geographical, cultural and historical other. However, it would not be wise to generalize such 
representations of othering to the whole EU. Although certain actors present Turkey as the 
EU’s geographical, cultural and historical other, there are also other actors that utilize 
cosmopolitan identity constructions. Looking at the parliamentary discourses and tracing 
such themes will be revealing the ideational continuities as well as changes after 2013. Using 
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the aforementioned background, the next section will elaborate on the themes of religion and 
civilization, as they are closely related with geography, culture and history.  
 
 
3.2.  Religion and Civilization   
 
 
Religion has been a key ideational theme that had an impact on EU-Turkey relations. When 
AKP emerged as the incumbent government, it defined itself as the representative of 
“conservative democracy” (Alpan 2016) that would bridge the Western and Eastern values 
in Turkey. As most of its cadre was born out of the National View (Milli Görüş) tradition, 
bridging Islamic values and the Ottoman legacy was key. AKP did not, however, present its 
attempt to harmonize these values in contradiction to Western values or Europe. On the 
contrary, AKP seemingly aimed to benefit from these “assets” with the aim of making Turkey 
one of the leading countries (Saraçoğlu and Demirkol 2015). AKP, as a “post-Islamist” 
movement (Dağı 2005; Rumelili 2008), sought to preserve its relationship with Islam while 
not applying it on political grounds.  
 
As Temel (2018) notes, the former prime minister Erdoğan made a declaration in 2003 saying 
that they deviated from the National View tradition which has its roots in radical Islam and 
anti-Westernism. Taking a different path than its ideological predecessors, AKP viewed 
Turkey’s modernization and democratization processes in tandem with the Copenhagen 
criteria (Tanıyıcı 2003). Thus, AKP utilized EU membership as an anchor that would increase 
religious freedoms, which would also degrade the role of groups in Turkey that oppose 
women wearing headscarves (Lindgaard 2018). As mentioned earlier, the headscarf debate 
was a major identity issue for Turkey from the EU’s perceptions when gender roles, freedom 
of expression and religion are considered.  
 
Thus, it could be argued that in the early 2000s, the Turkish government started to form a 
new Turkish identity that has its roots in her history and religion in a way that would not 
contradict Western or European values. However, such an ideational construct carried the 
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risk of being othered because as the majority of its population is Muslim, Turkey was one of 
the countries that had a negative image that links Islam with terrorism after the September 
11, 2001 attacks to the US World Trade Center (Verney 2009).  
  
When construction of European values is concerned, the literature on religion and civilization 
is widespread (Kösebalaban 2007; Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın 2007; Rumelili 2008). As stated 
earlier, the cultural heritage of Europe is coined with the religious and civilizational elements 
such as Christianity and Enlightenment (Huntington 1993; Ertuğrul and Yılmaz 2017). For 
instance, the confrontational and civilizational elements in the EU-Turkey relations are 
justified by civilizational elements between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. 
Representations of Europe as “civilized” and the Ottomans as “barbaric” are concurrent in 
the debates concerning EU-Turkey relations (Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın 2007). Furthermore, 
Christianity is argued to be a common denominator of Europeanness and a glue that binds 
European communities. These debates are still current in European discourses, especially in 
the EU-Turkey relations.  
 
Turkey’s attempts to reconstruct its identity in relation to the EU have civilizational roots as 
well. Trying to utilize Turkey’s hybridity in terms of having the capability of bridging 
different cultures, the AKP government expressed its full support for Turkey’s EU 
membership, by referring to the “alliance of civilizations”. Turkey was perceived as an 
extension of the European project that would proliferate peace and stability in her region. 
This way, the EU aimed at benefitting from Turkey’s regional role (Ertuğrul and Yılmaz 
2017). Turkey as the EU’s religious and civilizational other was presented as an asset that 
would work in favor of increasing European norms and values in the Balkans and Middle 
East. The AKP government acknowledged Turkey’s role of extending European norms to its 
proximate neighborhood by utilizing Turkey’s “hybrid identity” (Rumelili 2008) which was 
fed by Turkey’s historical roots. It would be beneficial to exemplify Turkey’s ideational 
perspective in the early 2000s:  
 
“If the EU is aiming to become a global power and wishing to eradicate the 
conflict of civilizations while becoming a global power, I am not saying this as a 
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bluff, but as a finding, as a truth, the alliance of civilizations must take place.” 
(BBC News Türkçe 2005) [author’s translation] 
 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 3 October 2005 
 
The timing of this speech coincides with the “Alliance of Civilizations Initiative” that was 
led by the former prime ministers of Turkey and Spain, Erdoğan and Zapatero. The initiative 
was later taken over by the UN to bridge the gap between eastern and western countries 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). It would be accurate to argue that 
this initiative came to be as a result of the post-9/11 war on terror and numerous terror attacks 
in Turkey and Europe, such as 2003 Istanbul bombings, 2004 Madrid train bombings and 
2005 London bombings. The significance of this initiative for the EU-Turkey relations is that 
the Turkish government tried to use the initiative to increase Turkey’s chances of 
membership to the EU. Though it created a positive image of Turkey in the EU, the EU was 
reluctant to show any effort for the initiative (Balcı and Miş 2008). In addition, there is only 
one reference to the initiative in the 2005 Progress Report (European Commission 2005).  
 
As it is evident in the initiative, Turkey’s civilizational discourse could be observed as 
another ideational construct. The civilizational discourse was such a significant ideational 
theme that both the proponents and opponents of Turkish membership based their arguments 
on civilizational matters (Tekin 2005). Although the EU was reluctant, Turkey’s discourse 
was echoed to a certain extent by certain European leaders at the time. As Lindgaard (2018) 
succinctly combines several European discourses, it is evident to observe some support 
towards Turkey’s membership. For instance, the former president of the EU Commission, 
José Manuel Durão Barroso, argued in 2008 that Turkey’s membership may be an inspiration 
for different cultures and civilizations because she is an exemplary case in which democracy 
and secularism coexist. Thus, Turkey could benefit the common European project (Aras and 
Akdoğan 2017).  
 
There is another line of ideational discourse in the literature on Turkey that was argued to 
pose a challenge to EU’s identity (Arkan 2016). The theme of “Turkey as a challenge to EU’s 
identity” was initially disregarded by the EU, which could be exemplified in one of Barroso’s 
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comments (Aras and Akdoğan 2017). Nevertheless, the AKP government echoed the 
perceptions of the EU, which were mentioned earlier, by arguing that the EU needs Turkey 
primarily because Turkey represents a combination of multiple strategic assets. Secondly, by 
accepting Turkey as an EU member, Turkey suggested that the EU would gain the 
opportunity to prove that it is not a “Christian Club” (Lindgaard 2018). As mentioned earlier, 
the “Christian Club” metaphor was still prevalent as the relations progressed. This strategy 
was again based on religious identities that was used to pressurize the EU to accept Turkey 
as a member (Öniş 2009). Overall, as could be observed, religion is a recurring ideational 
theme in the relations that was also used with the theme of “Turkey as a challenge to EU’s 
identity”, though not much emphasized. However, as Morozov and Rumelili (2012) suggest, 
Turkey’s criticism towards the EU of being a “Christian Club” could be a danger for Turkey 
to alienate herself further from the EU. Just as the authors predicted, Turkey’s alienation 
from the EU started at a very early stage in the accession negotiations. 
 
 
3.3.  Democratic and Territorial Disputes 
 
 
Democracy has been another demarcating and contentious issue between the EU and Turkey 
(Tekin 2010). As mentioned earlier, in the early years of Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, 
Turkey was having a political turbulence in which party closures were taking place along 
with growing concerns on individual rights and freedoms. The reform period that was 
initiated after 1999 and gained pace with the election of the AKP government was seen 
positively by the EU (Johansson-Nogués and Jonasson 2011). However, throughout the 
years, Turkey’s deteriorating democracy and her territorial disputes led Turkey to be 
perceived as the EU’s other.  
 
Democracy is considered to be at the center of the European identity, and it is constantly in 
the making (Rumelili 2008). The conventional / liberal constructivists argue that democracy 
and other core concepts that are associated with the EU are not formed in relation to others 
(Rumelili and Cebeci 2016). This is argued to be an internal process. Conversely, as this 
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thesis suggests, critical constructivists argue that collective identity formations are based on 
difference and othering. Similarly, democracy could be considered as an ideational theme in 
the EU-Turkey relations which constantly shapes Europeanness and Turkishness and how 
they are differentiated from one another.  
 
The relatively positive atmosphere in the EU-Turkey relations between 2002 and 2007 
increased the EU’s hopes for Turkey’s democracy and membership to the EU. However, the 
domestic struggles in Turkey during 2007 and 2008, especially the power struggle between 
AKP and the Turkish military, increased concerns on Turkish democracy (Esen and 
Gumuscu 2016), differentiating Turkey as non-European. Turkey’s transition to the 
“advanced democracy” narrative after 2007 brought a more critical approach to the EU on 
the part of Turkey (Alpan 2016). In addition, AKP’s transition to a more “neo-Ottomanist” 
foreign policy (Aydın-Düzgit 2018), aiming to acquire a more significant geopolitical role 
especially in the Middle East, amplified the ideational conflict between Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire.  
 
Territorial disputes have also been on the agenda in the EU-Turkey relations. It might be 
argued that territorial disputes have a big impact on the ideational constructs between the 
two. The first issue to be mentioned is the issue of Cyprus. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, the failure of the Annan Plan and the EU membership of Cyprus escalated the 
conflict (Kösebalaban 2007). Turkey’s relations with Cyprus are considered under the “good 
neighborly relations criterion” (Saatçioğlu 2009), which makes it hard for Turkey to move 
forward with the accession negotiations unless she extends her ports and airports to Cyprus. 
Along with the Kurdish issue and Turkey’s conflict with PKK, Cyprus issue is among the 
EU’s conditions for Turkey’s membership. Turkey resists such conditions and challenges the 
inclusivity of European identity (Rumelili 2004).  
 
With the increase in the number of refugees and terrorism, the territories and borders of the 
EU and Turkey were proved to be prone to security risks. Even at the beginning of the Syrian 
crisis, the MEPs were encouraging close cooperation with Turkey (European Parliament 
2011). Turkey acquired a significant position after the Readmission Deal in 2013 and the 
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statement between the EU and Turkey in 2016 by cooperating with the EU to prevent 
irregular migration and terrorist activities. Such close cooperation between the EU and 
Turkey did not increase Turkey’s chances of membership, although strategic partnership 
between the two gained momentum. Considering Turkey’s differentiated integration, one of 
the policy areas that Turkey opted in the most is security (Müftüler-Baç 2017). It is not, 
however, possible to point out to any references in the literature to issues related to identity 
in terms of Turkey’s strategic cooperation with the EU considering migration and terrorism.  
 
This chapter aimed to lay out the significant literature on identity in EU-Turkey relations 
between 1999 and 2013 to set the ground for the post-2013 analysis. It is evident to observe 
a positive and an accelerating trend in Turkey’s path to EU membership between 2002 and 
2007. As Turkey’s domestic political struggles and critical voices from the EU surged after 
2007, identity-related issues surpassed the focus on Turkey’s membership. The stagnated 
relations took a different turn after the Gezi Park Protests and the corruption investigations 
in 2013.  
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4. IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE POST-2013 EU-TURKEY 
RELATIONS 
 
 
 
This chapter, as the analysis part of this thesis, will examine the ideational themes in the EU-
Turkey relations after 2013. The themes that are provided by the literature, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, will be sought in the post-2013 period as the relations take a different path 
towards a strategic partnership while declining the prospect of EU membership for Turkey. 
This will be accomplished through a discourse analysis method, DHA. The discourses that 
are taken from the EP debates on Turkey between 2013 and 2016 will reveal the shifts as 
well as continuities in identity constructions. Thus, a systematic analysis of the previously 
outlined ideational themes will be conducted based on their continuation in the post-2013 
period. Firstly, the key events that occurred in 2013 will be discussed. Then, the analysis of 
the speeches of MEPs will be provided to observe the shifts in discourses of identities. As 
this thesis follows a social constructivist path, the significance of the incidents that took place 
in the relations, starting from 2013, will be emphasized along with the context to set the 
background for the discourse analysis.  
 
As outlined earlier, 2013 marks an important turning point both for Turkish democracy and  
EU-Turkey relations. On May 28, 2013, the demolition of Gezi Park in Taksim Square of 
Istanbul began with the aim of re-constructing the old Taksim Military Barracks that had 
been demolished in 1940. This move was initially prevented by a group of protestors with a 
sit-in. After the images of violent clashes between the security forces and the protestors 
spread through media, protests began to spread as well. The use of social media by the 
protestors to mobilize generated a quick turnout (Önal 2016). The mobilization of different 
socio-economic groups from different segments of society showed a public demand for 
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preservation of public places and against authoritarian tendencies which arguably increased 
after the violent clashes between the security forces and protestors (Göle 2013; Kirişçi and 
Toygür 2019; Önal 2016). 
 
The significance of the protests and the way they represented a turning point for the EU-
Turkey relations is worthy of examination in the aspects the protests revealed. Primarily, the 
protests were a reaction against the policies of the AKP government. Especially, it is argued 
that the protests carried a discontent on behalf of the secular segments against growing 
conservatism (Öniş 2015). Secondly, the EU was concerned about the violent protests and 
Turkey’s commitment to democracy. As Önal (2016) argues, the themes of democracy, 
human rights and civil society, which are considered to be “Euro-concepts”, came to the fore 
in the literature and discourses.  
 
The second crucial series of events that occurred in 2013 was the corruption and bribery 
investigations in Turkey in December 2013, which caused heavy political turmoil, especially 
in relation to the political rivalry between AKP and the Gulen Movement, which would later 
be known as FETO. Following the investigations came a cabinet shakeup as the former 
Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış was dismissed from his position. 
The other three ministers who were involved with the investigations resigned. One of the 
most crucial responses by the EU came from Štefan Füle, as he criticized the efficiency and 
impartiality of the investigations (Hürriyet 2013). In the following year, the EP convened for 
a debate on whether Bağış used EU Erasmus funds unlawfully (Özkan 2014).  
 
After the investigations, the AKP government passed a new legislation changing the structure 
of Council of Judges and Prosecutors, giving broad competence to the Ministry of Justice to 
appoint judges and prosecutors (Hamsici 2014). This legislation was criticized by the EU, 
although the legislation was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2014 
(CNN Türk 2014b). Lastly, the Progress Report on Turkey that was published by the EU 
towards the end of 2014 was dominated by concerns on corruption and the independence of 
the judiciary (European Commission 2014), creating the impression that the independence 
of the judiciary and the rule of law were damaged in Turkey. The EU’s strong emphasis on 
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the rule of law and criticisms towards Turkey were related to its 2013 Enlargement Strategy, 
placing the rule of law at the center (Eralp 2017).  
 
These incidents, as suggested by Lindgaard et al. (2018), caused the EU’s approach towards 
Turkey to shift from identity-related issues to concerns on rising authoritarianism and 
declining human rights and democracy records (Lindgaard 2018). Thus, these characteristics 
of the shift in discourses of identity in 2013 might have an effect on the increase of interest-
based discourses in the MEPs’ speeches, reducing the prospects of membership for Turkey, 
marking it as a milestone. However, this is not to argue that other ideational themes ceased 
to exist. As will be elaborated below in the empirical analysis, religious, civilizational and 
geographical discourses are still expected to be present, although they are not expected to be 
emphasized often. In the following sections, this shift will be demonstrated through the 
ideational themes that are driven by the literature and discourses. Firstly, the analysis will 
observe the ways in which Turkey is being presented as the EU’s undemocratic other. 
 
 
4.1.  Turkey as the Undemocratic Other 
 
 
In the post-2013 period, the first ideational theme that arises from the parliamentary 
discourses is democracy, which reveals a continuity from the pre-2013 period. Democracy 
has been a key part of the identity construction between the EU and Turkey because it has 
been constructed as a mechanism that is problematic in Turkey, while it is arguably taken for 
granted in the EU. Thus, it has been utilized as a frequent way of “othering” Turkey as Turkey 
is perceived to be in clear violation of the Copenhagen criteria (Table 4.1). From Table 4.1, 
it could be argued that there is a cross-party convergence around the theme of democracy, in 
which Turkey is being presented as the EU’s other. When the first EP debate on Turkey 
during the Gezi Park Protests convened on June 12, 2013, the protests were praised as a 
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reflection of democracy, while the response of the government was criticized as an anti-
democratic move:1 
 
“I have the impression that something is happening that is both enjoyable and at 
the same time disturbing. Rejoicing, because we have the feeling of seeing a new 
actor - civil society and citizens - spring up, promising for the deepening of 
democracy. At the same time, we are concerned because it is clear that the answer 
chosen for the moment by the authorities is authoritarianism, repression and 
security logic, which leads us to a Russian style brutal democracy.” 
 
Flautre, Greens / EFA, 12 June 2013 
 
Table 4.1 Number of speeches according to their ideational themes utilized by different 
party groups 
Party Groups  Turkey as the 
Undemocratic Other 
Turkey as the 
Religious and 
Civilizational Other 
Turkey as the 
Geographical 
Other 
European 
Commission 
- - - 
European Council - - - 
GUE/NGL 10 2 - 
Greens & EFA 5 - - 
S&D 10 2 - 
ALDE 2 2 - 
EPP 4 4 - 
ECR 14 11 1 
EFDD 17 6 5 
ENF 6 20 - 
NI 11 18 - 
Total 79 65 6 
 
In this excerpt, the Gezi Park Protests are observed in relation to democracy in Turkey. By 
doing so, the MEP from the Greens & EFA group provides a positive and a negative aspect 
about the protests. For this reason, she coins the term “brutal democracy” to point at both the 
deepening of and the deterioration of democracy in Turkey. Out of 68 speeches that are 
observed for the Greens & EFA group, only 5 of them represent Turkey as the EU’s 
 
1 For constructions of Turkey as the “undemocratic” other, see the speeches by Maria-Eleni Koppa (S&D) on June 12, 2013; 
Mark Demesmaeker (ECR) and Renate Sommer (EPP) on December 17, 2014; Bodil Valero (Verts/ALE) on October 7, 
2015; and Dimitrios Papadimoulis (GUE/NGL) on March 9, 2016.  
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undemocratic other. Most of the speeches strongly emphasize the deterioration of democracy 
in Turkey while supporting close cooperation with Turkey to face regional challenges. 
However, they also encourage the EU to stay attached to its values and not support Turkey’s 
authoritarian practices.  
 
A discursive examination of this excerpt in particular refers to Wodak’s (2001a) 
argumentation strategies. The justification of the protests in both positive and negative 
manners is done by using the topos of comparison between the types of democracies in 
Turkey and Russia. As Morozov and Rumelili (2012) suggests, Russia is the EU’s other 
“liminal other” besides Turkey. It is evident in this excerpt that Turkey is being treated as an 
“other” with its application of democracy and is likened to another country that the EU 
perceives as an “other”. As could be observed in Table 4.1, democracy is the most frequent 
theme that are present in the MEPs’ speeches in which Turkey is being othered as the EU’s 
undemocratic neighbor.  
 
There is another line of discourse in the EP that considers the deterioration of democracy and 
the protests as the causes of Turkey’s destabilization. Thus, instead of othering, this line of 
discourse embraces Turkey’s strategic importance for the EU and does not favor a 
destabilized Turkey at the EU’s border. However, it is not possible to see clear stances on 
Turkey’s membership: 
 
“Turkey is a positive and active partner of the European Union that has 
introduced numerous reforms: he is a loyal ally of the West within the Atlantic 
Alliance, where he took risks due to the invasion of Kuwait; it is a strategic 
country in the passage of the Black Sea hydrocarbons; and it is a country that 
plays an important role in the ‘Arab Spring’ conflict and has hosted more than 
400,000 Syrian refugees. Therefore, we cannot afford, Mrs. Ashton, a 
destabilization incited by the European Union of the situation in Turkey.”  
 
Sánchez-Neyra, EPP, 12 June 2013 
 
As a member of the largest group in the EP, Sánchez-Neyra took a different approach from 
Flautre by emphasizing the strategic importance of Turkey for the EU in a much larger 
context in which Turkey and the EU member states have interacted on different occasions. 
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Similarly, out of 203 speeches that are observed for the EPP group, only 4 speeches reflect 
Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other. Most of the MEPs from the EPP group, which is a 
center-right party, support building constructive and strategic dialogue with Turkey and 
support democracy to sustain in Turkey. However, as could be observed from the speeches 
of the EPP group, Turkey’s full membership to the EU is not voiced.  
 
In this excerpt, there is also an emphasis on the growing refugee crisis caused by the war in 
Syria. Thus, it is possible to mention several argumentation strategies here. For instance, by 
using the topos of history through a reference to the invasion of Kuwait, the MEP is 
presenting Turkey as an asset to the EU, without any comments on Turkey’s EU accession. 
In addition, it is also possible to encounter interdiscursive and intertextual elements in this 
excerpt as well. Turkey’s strategic importance has mostly been matched with its geographical 
position. Here, Turkey’s location near the Black Sea energy resources is being discursively 
related to its strategic importance. In addition, the intertextuality emanates from the official 
EU foreign policy, which focuses more on the strategic partnership with Turkey (Türkeş-
Kılıç 2019). Overall, the topos of usefulness/advantage is being utilized to include Turkey as 
a strategic partner.   
 
Another example of othering that is prevalent in the MEP discourses is through the theme of 
freedom of expression, in which Turkey has been likened to certain “others” of the EU. The 
deterioration of freedom of expression in Turkey (Esen and Gumuscu 2016), especially after 
the Gezi Park Protests, was subjected to scrutiny by several MEPs: 
 
“…I would call Turkey today, Mr. Swoboda, the biggest prison for journalists in 
the world. In the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index, it was ranked 
154th, just three places above the last dictatorship in Europe, Belarus. That is what 
is happening today in Turkey. In my opinion – and I did not hear this from the 
European Union in its message – what is happening in Turkey is constant abuse 
by an overbearing state. I call it a ‘tyranny of a majority’, in the words of John 
Stuart Mill, a system in which decisions taken by a majority are always more 
important than the rights of minorities and the rights of individual people. This 
trend goes beyond Turkey. Look at Mr. Putin in Russia and even Mr. Orbán in 
Hungary. Here we are talking about Turkey and Mr. Erdoğan.” 
 
Verhofstadt, ALDE, 12 June 2013 
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The MEP Verhofstadt, as one of the influential members of the liberal centrist ALDE group, 
explicitly criticizes Turkey in terms of freedom of expression by using a metaphor of “prison 
for journalists”. Taking Europe as a geographical construct, Verhofstadt compares the figures 
of Turkey with a non-EU country, Belarus, by referring her as “the last dictatorship in 
Europe”. Moreover, there is also an intertextual element within the excerpt with the reference 
to a well-renounced concept in political philosophy as a discursive strategy. The MEP also 
makes a comparison between Turkey, Russia and an-EU member, Hungary. In the literature, 
it is argued that as the EU’s transformative capacity and Western liberal democracies are 
losing their popularities as a result of recent economic and identity problems, causing 
nationalist and populist leaders to rise in Turkey, Russia and Hungary (Öniş 2016). Thus, 
Verhofstadt’s way of grouping these countries as the EU’s others is also argued by the 
literature. In addition, not only there is the othering of Turkey with the EU’s “liminal other”, 
Russia, but there is also an othering of Hungary within the EU, as an EU member that is 
being criticized for her anti-democratic and anti-EU practices. This bears significance as it 
also reveals the EU’s internal identity crisis.  
 
Corruption represents another issue to be discussed in the EU-Turkey relations. Especially 
after the 2013 corruption investigations in Turkey, the emerging power struggle between the 
government and the Gulen Movement became evident (Yavuz and Koç 2016). As Turkey 
was rattled by more domestic struggles following the Gezi Park Protests, the discourses in 
the EP became more sceptic towards Turkey’s membership. In several discourses, Turkey 
was presented as an undemocratic EU candidate which is also prone to corruption: 
 
“The independence of the judiciary, the freedom of the judges to decide for 
themselves, the right to recognize what is right, is limited by the fact that there 
were hundreds, even thousands, of forced evictions at the moment when the 
judiciary systematically opposed itself for the first time obviously widespread 
corruption at the top of the state has turned. This whole development, like the 
deadlock in constitutional reform, is really worrying. And I say to you here: we 
have to work with Turkey, it's - I said that - a big, important neighbour and a 
proud country. We need to work together on energy policy, we need to work 
together in foreign policy - it is admirable what Turkey is doing for the Syrian 
refugees. But the accession process, which we started in 2005 and does not budge 
at all, which, paradoxically, has worsened rather than improved relations between 
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the European Union and Turkey, this accession process must be suspended. We 
should suspend negotiations until Turkey comes to the right again and respects 
the freedoms of its citizens and the independence of its judiciary.” 
 
Lambsdorff, ALDE, 11 March 2014 
 
In this excerpt that is taken from the parliamentary debate on the 2013 progress report on 
Turkey, the MEP is voicing his concern on the status of the judiciary in Turkey with a specific 
focus on the corruption investigations that took place in December 2013. Out of 90 speeches 
that are observed for the ALDE group, only 2 speeches, by Verhofstadt and Lambsdorff, 
present Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other. As a centrist group, the MEPs from the 
ALDE group highlight the deterioration of democracy in Turkey by pointing out that the rule 
of law and the independence of judiciary are in decline, while urging strategic cooperation 
with Turkey to counter regional challenges. In addition to their evaluations about Turkey’s 
democratic status, the MEPs present Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other because they 
also propose the accession negotiations to be suspended due to Turkey’s lack of progress in 
terms of democratic standards.  
 
The excerpt above makes it visible to observe an emphasis on strategic partnership while 
showing that the prospects of membership are undermined. Although the speaker uses 
predication strategies to refer to Turkey as a “big, important neighbor” and a “proud” country 
as positive traits, he urges the parliament to suspend the accession process though it does not 
have such a power in the EU. In addition, as an argumentation strategy, he uses the topos of 
humanitarianism to reflect on Turkey’s efforts to host Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, the 
MEP sets a clear example of the core issues in the EU which an acceding member has to deal 
with. Turkey is being represented as the EU’s other in terms of human rights and judicial 
independence.  
 
There are also critical MEPs who pose essential criticisms to the EU by disapproving its 
approach to Turkey. These criticisms position Turkey as an undemocratic country and the 
EU as a cooperator with this “undemocratic other”. From these aspects, the EU is put under 
scrutiny to determine its path between European identity that excludes Turkey or European 
interests that integrates Turkey (Rumelili 2008): 
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“In the meantime, Erdogan now feels like an Ottoman sultan and feels 
strengthened by the weak attitude of the European Union. In a previous statement, 
Ms. Ashton stated that the EU is determined to strengthen the dialogue with 
Turkey. Erdogan rages. And what does the EU do? It simply rolls out the red 
carpet for Erdogan. Mr. President, this is really absurd! Enough is enough! As far 
as the PVV is concerned, Erdogan is definitely not welcome in Brussels! The EU 
is not worth it if it still sends an invitation to this Islamist!” 
 
Stassen, NI, 12 June 2013 
 
As an independent MEP, Stassen poses criticisms mainly to the EU over Turkey’s accession. 
Out of 64 speeches delivered by Non-Inscrits, 11 speeches contain elements that constructs 
Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other. Although the Non-Inscrits do not carry party 
affiliations in the EP, it is possible to observe similar themes and argumentation strategies in 
their speeches. As exemplified by Stassen’s speech, the majority of Non-Inscrits oppose 
Turkey’s membership to the EU based on Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies. Mostly through 
labelling strategies, the Non-Inscrits present Turkey as the undemocratic other.  
 
As could be observed from this excerpt, the historical tension between Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire is a reflection of the intertextual element which represents the Ottomans as 
“hostile” and “barbaric” while Europe is the “civilized” side (Levin 2011; Müftüler-Baç and 
Taşkın 2007). As a member of the right-wing populist party in the Netherlands, PVV, Stassen 
expresses a party position that is known by its Eurosceptic and anti-Turkey tendencies. 
Consequently, the MEP uses predication strategies to label the Turkish president as an 
“Ottoman sultan” and “Islamist” based on stereotypical traits.2 These traits are based on 
AKP’s Islamic and anti-secular past, as they will be elaborated further in the following 
sections (Yavuz and Koç 2016).  
 
Besides essentialist criticisms, there are also constructions of Europeanness in the discourses 
of the MEPs based on democratic values, such as respect for human rights and freedom of 
speech and the press. The enlargement policy of the EU shaped the identity of the EU towards 
 
2 For reconstructions of the Ottoman traits, see the speeches by Ewald Stadler (NI), Andreas Mölzer (NI) and Antigoni 
Papadopoulou (S & D) on June 12, 2013; Davor Ivo Stier (EPP) on March 11, 2014; Marcel de Graaff (ENF), Nicolas Bay 
(ENF) and Kristina Winberg (EFDD) on April 13, 2016; Charles Tannock (ECR) on June 8, 2016.  
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becoming the “promoter of human rights and democracy” (Sedelmeier 2003). In addition, 
the EU emerged as a normative power that aims to bring stability to its closer neighborhood 
(Manners 2002). The escalation of war in Syria after 2011 caused an influx of Syrian refugees 
to Turkey’s and the EU’s borders and became one of the biggest challenges for both actors, 
especially for the EU’s normative power. Thus, the EU’s normative power was once again 
under pressure. Following 2013, the number of non-state armed forces in Syria surged, as the 
Islamic State became the largest of all. The Islamic State started its terror attacks first in Iraq 
and spread to the world as of 2014 and onwards. Europe and Turkey were challenged by 
several terrorist attacks claimed by the Islamic State while the influx of refugees continued. 
In the period between 2013 and 2016, the line of identity construction that emphasizes 
European democratic values, especially on human rights, is still present to position Turkey 
as unfit for European values: 
 
“Madam President, Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish people, not just within 
their own borders but also against those bravely fighting IS in Iraq and Syria, is 
a scandal. All will have been pleased when the armed conflict between Turkey 
and the PKK was brought to a mostly peaceful conclusion, yet now we are 
witnessing the Turkish authorities rekindle that fight. What is worse is that, not 
content with President Erdoğan’s attack on a free press and journalists, his wrath 
is now being directed towards the Kurdish people. Damningly, evidence mounts 
highlighting collusion between Turkish authorities and Islamic State in the 
region, including support for oppressive actions towards Kurds. This is a timely 
reminder of the fundamental differences between Turkish and European values 
and is further proof that Turkey must never be allowed to join the European 
Union.” 
 
Carver, EFDD, 20 January 2016 
 
The MEP addresses several issues to construct European values that are in contradiction with 
Turkey. This speech is taken from the EP debate on the “Situation in the South East of 
Turkey”, at a time when Turkey’s south eastern border was prone to large waves of Syrian 
refugees, the conflict between Turkey and PKK and the rise of Islamic State. The EFDD 
group, which is a right-wing party group in the EP, has 68 speeches that are observed in this 
thesis and 17 of them reflect Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other. Compared to other 
party groups in the EP, the EFDD group has the greatest number of speeches that utilize such 
an ideational othering. As can be observed in this excerpt, most of the speeches given by 
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EFDD parliamentarians oppose Turkey’s membership to the EU based on Turkey’s 
undemocratic practices towards the freedom of speech and the Kurdish issue. Other speeches 
mainly reflect the EFDD’s Eurosceptic position through criticizing the ways in which the EU 
cooperates with Turkey to deal with regional challenges and the position the EU obtains in 
Turkey’s accession negotiations.  
 
In this excerpt, the emphasis on Kurdish people in this speech is exemplifying the divergence 
between Turkey and the EU in their attitudes towards the issue. As it will become more 
evident, this is an intertextual element that is present in other discourses as well. Carver 
criticizes Turkey on the basis of human rights and freedom of the press. As a 
referential/nomination strategy, the MEP constructs an in-group, Europe, and an out-group, 
Turkey, that are distinct in terms of their values. In addition, the alleged “collusion” between 
Turkey and the Islamic State is observable in several discourses of the MEPs.3 By doing so, 
Turkey is being presented as an EU candidate that is involved with a terrorist group such as 
the Islamic State. Thus, Carver suggests that Turkey must not be allowed in the EU.  
 
The EU closely associates the conflict between Turkey and PKK with the rights of Kurdish 
people in Turkey, linking the issue with democratic rights and freedoms. That is why, this 
issue could be regarded under the democracy theme in which Turkey is presented as the other. 
Turkey’s othering by the EU in this matter increased after the failure of Oslo talks and 
ceasefire between Turkey and PKK, as the armed struggle continued especially in 2011 and 
2012. The issues regarding the minority rights in Turkey, more specifically the rights of the 
Kurdish population in Turkey, became a major concern in the EU-Turkey relations. However, 
it is vital to note that there is not much emphasis in the literature that regards the status of the 
minorities in Turkey as an ideational issue.  
 
In the post-2013 period, with the escalation of the border conflicts between Turkey and PKK, 
it is possible to observe the agenda items regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey. Along 
with democratic concerns, the EU’s approach towards Turkey in this issue became more 
 
3 See, for instance, the speeches by Angel Djambazki (ECR) on December 17, 2014; Kostas Chrysogonos (GUE/NGL) and 
James Carver (EFDD) on October 7, 2015; and Eleftherios Synadinos (NI) on January 20, 2016.  
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linked to territorial disputes. Similarly, as argued for the 2007-2013 period, Cyprus became 
a recurring issue in the post-2013 period that regards Turkey as an “other” that has territorial 
disputes with an EU member. The issue was overwhelmed by the failure of reunification 
talks and in sharing the energy resources. In the following excerpt, it is possible to observe 
all the issues that are mentioned in this section:   
 
“So far, only one chapter of 33 has been opened and closed, as Turkey still refuses 
to recognize the Republic of Cyprus. The decline of secular Turkey and the rise 
to power of the Islamist AKP has posed new challenges as President Erdoğan’s 
increasingly erratic authoritarian approach takes on the students, the army, 
journalists and now the rival Islamist group, the Gülenists, who have dared 
challenge the corruption and obstruction of justice in that country. Erdoğan has 
also backtracked on the PKK ceasefire negotiations, and only under huge NATO 
pressure has he finally agreed to allow support for beleaguered Kurdish forces in 
Kobani, as he sees brutal ISIS as less of a threat to Turkish interests than the 
secular PKK. There has also been Western alarm about Turkey’s alleged support 
to jihadists in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, but despite all this, we all still hope that 
Turkey may still change course towards a more Western path it once held.” 
 
Tannock, ECR, 17 December 2014 
 
The ECR group, which is a center-right party, has a total of 124 speeches observed in this 
thesis and 14 of them construct Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other. As the members of 
a center-right party, the MEPs strongly criticize Turkey’s authoritarian approach. At this 
point, an important distinction could be made to differentiate between discourses that 
criticize Turkey’s authoritarian practices and present Turkey as the EU’s undemocratic other. 
Although they could not be differentiated from one another in certain speeches, this thesis 
adopts certain methods to discern how Turkey is being presented as the EU’s undemocratic 
other. As could be observed in the aforementioned speeches, one line of discourse supports 
Turkey’s accession negotiations to be stopped based on Turkey’s undemocratic status. As in 
Tannock’s speech above, exemplification of multiple instances in which Turkey obtained an 
authoritarian approach is being utilized to present Turkey as the EU’s problematic neighbor. 
 
The MEP, in this excerpt, addresses many issues that are mentioned in this section. Starting 
with the issue of Cyprus, the MEP points out to the territorial and possible the customs union 
51 
 
dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. Moreover, he addresses the concerns on growing 
conservatism and deteriorating democracy in Turkey, followed by the power struggle 
between the government and the Gulen Movement. Regarding Turkey’s conflict with the 
Islamic State and PKK, there is an intertextual element that is also present in Farage’s 
discourse that suggests Turkey’s fight against the Islamic State as unconvincing as Turkey is 
argued to perceive the Islamic State as “less of a threat”. The reference to Kobani is 
significant here because, as a stronghold of PKK in Syria, PKK accuses Turkey of obstructing 
the peace process by allowing the Islamic State to mobilize in Kobani (Yıldız 2014). 
Furthermore, the reference to Turkey’s alleged support to jihadists in the mentioned countries 
may be interlinked with AKP’s close relations with Muslim Brotherhood (Saraçoğlu and 
Demirkol 2015). This reflects an interdiscursive element that coins Islam with terrorism and 
jihadist movements, as AKP is argued to be an Islamist party as a negative predication 
strategy.  
 
The excerpt above is an exemplary one in terms of the ideational discourses in the EU because 
it covers two of the issue areas that are mentioned in this section, the Kurdish question and 
Cyprus, as the Cyprus issue shows a continuity from the pre-2013 period. These issues are 
utilized as a way of othering Turkey as an undemocratic country that has territorial disputes 
and may pose a threat and a challenge to the EU. It is also beneficial to argue that the political 
groups in the EP converge around the theme of “Turkey as the undemocratic other”. Using 
the table in Table 2.2 that shows the political orientations of party groups in the EP, it is 
possible to suggest that this particular ideational theme includes different party groups of 
various political orientations. 
 
There are also over 300 speeches besides the aforementioned 79 speeches that focus on 
Turkey’s democratic issues. However, those speeches do not present Turkey as the EU’s 
undemocratic other. On the contrary, although the MEPs highlight and emphasize their 
concerns on democracy in Turkey, they approach the EU-Turkey relations constructively, 
arguing that the issues in the EU-Turkey relations should be dealt with through moving 
further with the relations. In addition, there are also certain speeches in which Turkey’s 
strategic importance for the EU is voiced.  
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Finally, when the JPC meeting minutes are considered, it is possible to observe that there is 
a parallel between the MEPs criticisms in the EP and JPC towards Turkey’s democratic 
status. For instance, a special emphasis was given to the Gezi Park Protests in the 72nd 
meeting on June 27-28, 2013. In several speeches delivered by the MEPs, the excessive use 
of force is being criticized. In addition, MEPs urged Turkey to stay committed to democratic 
principles and the EU accession negotiations. In the 73rd meeting on December 5-6, 2013, 
the MEPs pointed out that Turkey is drifting away from democratic principles. They also 
underlined the issues concerning the status of minorities and their fundamental rights. The 
democratization package that was announced on September 30, 2013 was considered to be 
weak. In the 74th meeting on April 10-11, 2014, it is possible to see a continuation of MEPs’ 
concerns on Turkey’s democratic status.  
 
Starting with the 75th meeting on November 11, 2014, it is possible to observe a change of 
focus from democratic concerns to the regional challenges faced both by the EU and Turkey. 
Along with such issues, the visa liberalization dialogue with Turkey was supported by the 
MEPs. Nevertheless, in the 76th meeting on March 19-20, 2015, the MEPs voiced their 
concerns on Turkey’s democracy especially regarding the freedom of media. In the next two 
chapters, it will be possible to observe the discursive constructions of Turkey as the other 
through the themes of religion, civilization and geography along with the relevant agenda 
items in the JPC meetings.  
 
 
4.2.  Turkey as the Religious and Civilizational Other 
 
 
The second themes of identity construction that is common after 2013 in the EU-Turkey 
relations are religion and civilization. As mentioned in Chapter 3, religion and civilization 
are two ideational themes that are mostly associated with each other. Although civilization 
could be observed as a broad concept that may include religious identity constructions, it 
would be beneficial to seek for the discourses in which religion and civilization are used 
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together and separately to present Turkey as the EU’s other. Table 4.1 suggests that religion 
and civilization as ideational themes are being utilized mostly by the right-wing party groups 
in the EP along with Non-Inscrits. As mentioned earlier, religious and civilizational identity 
constructions were frequent between 1999 and 2013, as put forward by the literature on EU-
Turkey relations. After 2013, such constructions of identity were still common due to the 
incidents that took place in the EU-Turkey relations.  
From a social constructivist view, Christianity is an ideational construct that is coined with 
Europeanness and, thus, the EU. As a country that has a Muslim majority, Turkey had used 
religion to challenge the EU’s identity, especially right after the election of AKP. The AKP 
government used the “Christian Club” rhetoric to challenge the EU’s identity by encouraging 
the EU to include a Muslim country (Rumelili 2008). However, not only this encouragement 
was not echoed by the EU, it caused religion to become a way of othering Turkey. Combined 
with the “post-Islamist” outlook of the AKP, religion became a way of othering especially 
for the opponents of Turkey’s membership in the EU.   
It is also possible to examine the aspects that are associated with Islam. One way of 
constructing Islam ideationally is through its alleged monolithic quality and connection to 
terrorism (Aydın-Düzgit 2013). The lack of diversity that was discursively created for Islam 
is argued in relation to the immigrant population in Europe that poses security risks for 
Europe. In addition, the post-9/11 period that generated a connection between Islam and 
terrorism spread to the EU discourse which is regarded under the theme of security. The surge 
in the number of Syrian refugees and the creation of Islamic State in the post-2013 period 
exacerbated such concerns against Turkey in the EU discourse: 
 
“The Turkish government commits crimes against humanity through genocide 
against the Kurdish population. The Turkish government is silencing every 
opposition to its radical Islamic agenda. The country is sliding into an Islamic 
dictatorship. The sultan of Ankara is accelerating the Islamization of the EU. 
Grey wolves demonstrate in the squares of our capitals, mosques call for hatred 
of our state and culture, migrants engulf our villages and towns combatively. I 
say to the Commission: no accession negotiations, no visa-free travel, no money 
for this corrupt clique! Turkey can never become a member of the European 
Union!” 
 
de Graaff, ENF, 13 April 2016 
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This excerpt taken from the debate on the 2015 Report on Turkey provides an example for 
the aforementioned religious othering fueled by the flow of refugees into Europe. As a 
member of a right-wing conservative party group, de Graaff, utilizes religious and 
civilizational othering and excludes Turkey from the EU. Out of 58 speeches given by ENF 
MEPs, 20 of them contain religious and civilizational othering of Turkey. ENF has the 
greatest number of speeches that contain religious and civilizational othering of Turkey. As 
could be exemplified by this excerpt, the members of the ENF group frequently benefits from 
intensification strategies while utilizing religion and civilization as ideational themes to 
exclude Turkey.  
 
There are certain related issues that the MEP mentions when presenting Turkey as the EU’s 
religious and civilizational other. Regarding the Kurdish population, de Graaff uses the term 
“genocide” and intensifies his proposition that accuses Turkey of committing crimes. In 
relation to this section of the thesis in particular, the speaker benefits from predication 
strategies to label the president of Turkey as a “sultan” with reference to the Ottoman Empire. 
Furthermore, the interdiscursive element that ties Islam with the topos of threat is sustained 
through his references to the paramilitary organization of the MHP in Turkey, called “Grey 
wolves” (Yavuz 2002), and migrants. The speaker intensifies his proposition by accusing 
these two groups of spreading Islam and damaging European values as well as European 
villages and towns. Finally, as de Graaff utilizes, the opponents of the visa liberalization talks 
prioritize Islamophobic sentiments, as Muslim Turkish citizens would supposedly be in 
Europe and undermine Christianity. Secondly, similar discourses argue that the EU, as a 
civilization, is blind to its values by prioritizing its strategic aims over Turkey’s democratic 
issues.4 
 
As such discourses that regard Turkey as the religious and civilizational other continued, 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance paved the way for an increasing strategic partnership 
between the EU and Turkey.  The strategic prospects between the EU and Turkey to counter 
 
4 For such critical constructions of Europeanness, see the speeches by Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI) on 12 June 
2013; Ska Keller (Greens/EFA) on December 2, 2015; Ana Gomes (S&D) on March 9, 2016; Mark 
Demesmaeker (ECR) on June 8, 2016 and Marie-Christine Vergiat (GUE / NGL) on May 11, 2016. 
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the growing number of refugees increased in the early 2016, as both actors prepared a joint 
statement regarding their agreement that aimed to secure the transfer of EU funds to Turkey 
to facilitate the accommodation of refugees in Turkey and sharing of information to combat 
irregular migrant crossings (European Council 2016). This strategic initiative, however, 
increased the use of religious othering by certain groups in the EP with the fear of being 
“invaded” by Muslims.5 The joint statement was also criticized because it was argued that it 
strengthened Turkey’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Europe: 
 
“It is easy to foresee the criteria that will govern the management of the Turkish 
brand, the Erdogan brand of refugees, while three hundred, those who say four 
hundred thousand refugees threaten to invade Italy and it is no coincidence that 
Turkey prudently blocks the borders. We are under blackmail of a tipaccio like 
Erdogan, only a few days have passed and already Turkey threatens to suspend 
the agreement - and Amnesty's protests - Erdogan, who is an Islamist extremist, 
wants the invasion of Europe: never, never, never, never! Never, the invasion of 
Europe by the Turks, by the Muslims: never, never, never!” 
 
Borghezio, ENF, 13 April 2016 
 
Another example from the ENF group, which is a party group that often benefits from 
religious and civilizational references, could be provided here to observe the ways in which 
Turkey is being othered. The MEP, during the debate on the 2015 Report on Turkey, 
criticizes the agreement between the EU and Turkey mostly through religious identity 
constructions. As evident in the previous speech, Borghezio also benefits from the 
intensification strategy to argue that refugees pose a threat to “invade” Europe, most 
particularly Italy. Not only the MEP positions the refugees as invaders, he also labels Turkey 
as willing to invade Europe, echoing the dichotomous identity constructions between Europe 
and the Ottoman Empire. This is yet another example of the utilization of the topos of threat.  
 
Borghezio also strongly benefits from predication strategies, similar to the ones that are 
observable in the speech of de Graaff. He uses derogatory labels such as “tipaccio”, which 
refers to a mean or a bad character in Italian, and “Islamist extremist” to justify his religious 
 
5 For similar reconstructions of religious othering, see the speeches by Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI) on June 12, 
2013; Zoltán Balczó (NI) on June 10, 2015; Marcel de Graaff (ENF) on December 2, 2015; Auke Zijlstra (ENF) 
on 2 February 2016; Notis Marias (ECR) and Nikos Androulakis (S&D) on June 8, 2016.  
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othering. The reasons behind such religious othering could be sought in the growing 
conservatism and Islamization of the incumbent party in Turkey between 2013 and 2016 
(Kaya 2015). This reinforces the reconstruction of the European religious identity, especially 
by the opponents of Turkey’s membership. Combined with the far-right populist parties’ 
encouragement of Islamophobic and anti-refugee sentiments, religious othering of Turkey 
between 2013 and 2016 is noticeable.  
The Islamization of AKP in Turkey has its traces in Turkey’s changing foreign policy. As 
stated earlier in this study, Turkish foreign policy turned more to the East following the Arab 
Spring with the aims of becoming the representative of the Islamic world in the international 
arena, trying to revitalize her “model country” image (Keyman 2016; Kirişçi and Toygür 
2019) that was initially praised by the EU. As Turkey moved away from the EU and sought 
new ties in the East, religious discourses started to be utilized frequently. Between 2013 and 
2016, it is possible to observe critical voices in the EP that oppose Turkey’s EU membership 
on the grounds that Turkey belongs to the Islamic world as Europe is made up of Christian 
member states. Some MEPs refer to the murder of three Christians in Malatya, Turkey in 
2007 (Birch 2007) to justify their opposition.6 
There is also another line of discourse that could be placed under the civilizational theme 
which questions and puts the burden on the European project rather than constructing Turkey 
as an “other.” This line of discourse calls for a re-evaluation of the European values in a time 
of crises and challenges: 
 
“The refugee challenge is above all a European challenge. However, we must 
look at the Mediterranean and Africa if we do not want to live in an eternal and 
painful emergency. Whether it is Turkey, Russia or another country, we are 
against the relocation of European problems to other countries. It is not others 
who have to solve our problems. It is time for Member States to assume their 
responsibilities through binding decisions. We don't expect others to do what we 
have to do. The decline of European civilization will be stopped only by 
recovering our moral strength, the dignity that has made us appreciate and 
esteemed throughout the world.” 
 
Pittella, S&D, 9 March 2016 
 
6 See, for instance, the speeches given by Bastiaan Belder (EFDD) on March 11, 2014; Bastiaan Belder (ECR) on May 20, 
2015; and Udo Voigt (NI) on April 13, 2016.  
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The MEP, during the debate titled “Preparation of the European Council meeting of 17 and 
18 March 2016 and outcome of the EU-Turkey summit”, focuses on the surge in the flow of 
refugees to the EU. Rather differently than the excerpts presented earlier, he urges the EU to 
find an internal solution to the challenges they face as a community, rather than commenting 
on the relations with Turkey. Out of 218 speeches delivered by S&D members, only two 
speeches carry religious and civilizational identity constructions. In addition, this speech 
does not other Turkey as an out-group. On the contrary, it is a speech that does not exclude 
Turkey, though it urges the EU to revitalize its civilizational strength.  
 
The normative references such as “moral strength” and “dignity” echo the normative power 
arguments in the EU (Manners 2002) which establish the EU’s prominent role in the world. 
The humanitarian crisis as a result of the massive mobility of refugees who were seeking 
shelter in the EU challenged the EU’s normative power that includes humanitarian aid as one 
of its priorities. Pittella makes a reference to the humanitarian crisis as a European challenge 
that should be solved by the EU itself. Although they are not in this excerpt, the European 
identity and solidarity are also being challenged by other internal issues. Eurosceptic, 
nationalist and populist governments, such as in Hungary, Romania, Poland and Italy, pose 
essentialist criticisms to European integration. Finally, Brexit is the last of these challenges 
that initiated an EU member’s departure from the EU (Postelnicescu 2016).   
 
Overall, the religious and civilizational identity constructions, although they are still present, 
are not dominant as they were in the early stages of Turkey’s accession negotiations. As 
could be observed in the aforementioned exemplary discourses, religious and civilizational 
identity constructions are mostly voiced in far-right discourses. Between 2013 and 2016, 
religious othering is largely due to the growing conservatism and Islamization of the Turkish 
government, the growing number of refugees and threats posed by the Islamic State. Thus, 
the discourses of a group of MEPs regarding Turkey as a Muslim country are exclusivist in 
the sense that they emphasize Christianity as a unifying element in the EU. When the JPC 
meeting minutes are observed, there is only one meeting, the 76th meeting on March 2015, 
out of five meetings that are examined in which Islam was one of the agenda items primarily 
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because of the rising Islamophobic trends in Europe. In the meeting minutes, it is not possible 
to observe an instance where Turkey is being othered religiously and under the theme of 
civilization. Because religion and civilization are intertextual ideational themes, they may 
include geographical discourses as well, which will be analyzed in the following section. 
 
 
4.3.  Turkey as the Geographical Other 
 
 
Between 2013 and 2016, it is still possible to encounter geographical constructions of identity 
in the EU. As in the religious and civilizational identity constructions, geographical 
constructions of identity are voiced mostly by the right-wing parties (Table 4.1). The 
challenges that were posed to the EU by the influx of refugees and terrorist attacks in 2015 
and 2016 revealed how susceptible the EU’s border security is. Consequently, the EU’s 
southeastern neighbor, Turkey, which borders Syria, Iraq and Iran, came under scrutiny. As 
many refugees sought shelter in Turkey or used Turkey as a transit to Europe, the EU and 
Turkey increased their cooperation by organizing summits and preparing agreements to 
monitor their borders.  
 
The close cooperation between the EU and Turkey both increased Turkey’s strategic position 
in the eyes of the EU and concerns regarding the EU’s borders. As a result, identity 
constructions on geographical discourses were revitalized between 2013 and 2016. For 
instance, certain geographical exclusions of Turkey were still a reflection of the pre-2013 
constructions that presented Turkey as a Middle Eastern / Asian country. Other geographical 
constructions include labelling Turkey as a threat if she were to become an EU member, 
extending the EU’s borders to Middle East:7 
 
  
 
7 For similar geographical constructions of identity, see the speeches by William (The Earl of) Dartmouth 
(EFDD) on March 11, 2014; and May 20, 2015; Nigel Farage (EFDD) on December 2, 2015 and March 9, 
2016; and Ryszard Czarnecki (ECR) on April 13, 2016. 
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“Let’s look at Turkey. It is a country that is barely democratic and where free 
speech is increasingly attacked. It is a country that has a disgraceful human rights 
record, it is a country that is accused of aiding and abetting Islamic State, and it 
is a country that is going through the process of creeping Islamification. Turkey 
is also not geographically European. Only 3% of Turkey actually falls within 
Europe and it borders places that clearly want to harm us: Syria, Iraq and Iran.” 
 
Nuttall, EFDD, 28 April 2016 
 
This excerpt, which is taken from the debate on the EU-Turkey joint statement, reveals a 
similarity with the aforementioned speeches because of its emphasis on the democratic status 
of Turkey, the alleged cooperation between Turkey and Islamic State and growing 
Islamization in the country. The more significant message that was given in this excerpt is 
the geographical construction of Europe and exclusion of Turkey. Out of 68 EFDD speeches 
that are observed in this thesis, 5 of them contains Turkey’s geographical othering. As could 
be observed in other speeches given by EFDD members, Nuttall is positioning Turkey as a 
geographical out-group by using the statistic of %3, also benefitting from religious themes. 
Moreover, by utilizing the topos of threat, the MEP argues that accepting Turkey to the EU 
would mean bordering countries that are willing to pose a threat to the EU. By doing so, the 
MEP creates a civilizational discourse that is close to the clash of civilizations thesis through 
positioning Europe on one side and Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran on the other.  
 
Combined with the aforementioned background, the discourses of the MEPs that are 
observed in the post-2013 period reveal Turkey’s membership as being positioned next to 
the debates on migration and borders. Once again, geography became an ideational theme 
that showed a continuity in the EU-Turkey relations. As it was argued in the literature, Turkey 
was presented as a Middle Eastern/Asian country by the opponents of Turkey’s membership 
to the EU. As Turkey’s southeastern border became more problematic after 2013, the 
discourses in the EP were shaped around the borders of the EU if Turkey became a member. 
Furthermore, the opponents of European integration use exclusionary ideational discourses 
towards Turkey by justifying their arguments with the challenges the EU faces from Turkey’s 
borders even by not including Turkey as a member. The Readmission Agreement in 2013 
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between the EU and Turkey, which is set to pave the way for visa liberalization, escalated 
these concerns, reflecting the growing Islamophobic and populist discourses: 
 
“I guess what you are doing is this: you are saying the way we will stop illegal 
immigration is to make it all legal immigration, and if that does not take the 
biscuit, now you are going to fast-track Turkey to be an EU Member State. So let 
us just think about that. A country, 97% of whose land mass is in Asia, apparently 
you want to join Europe. It is a country that appears to be keener on bombing the 
Kurds than it is on taking on ISIS. It is a country that has turned a complete blind 
eye to ISIS fighters travelling through its territory. It is a country where, 
according to the Pew institute in a poll last week, 8% of those 75 million actively 
encourage and support the aims of ISIS. It is a country directly and closely linked 
with buying ISIS oil, and we will finish up bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran.” 
 
Farage, EFDD, 2 December 2015 
 
As could also be seen in Carver’s speech earlier, the EFDD group, known by its Eurosceptic 
and populist tendencies, reflects the growing concerns considering Turkey’s membership in 
a situation where Europe is being challenged by the growing number of refugees and 
terrorism. Migration emerges as a new issue between 2013 and 2016 that does not show a 
continuity from the pre-2013 period. As an underlying issue, however, geography is linked 
to migration. As it was argued in the first section of Chapter 3, the topos of geography, as an 
argumentation strategy, is once again being utilized in this excerpt over the concerns of 
extending the EU’s neighbors to Syria, Iraq and Iran. In addition, Farage is also referring to 
the claims that suggest Turkey as in an alleged trade relationship with the Islamic State and 
the opinion surveys that reveal the Turkish people who support the Islamic State. 
Consequently, Farage is trying to establish a link between Turkey and terrorism via using the 
topos of threat. An interdiscursive element in this excerpt could also be discerned as the MEP 
associates Turkish membership with terrorism as a result of its border conflicts with PKK. 
 
 
These challenges caused the EU to revitalize its debates on its identity, most particularly its 
borders and geographical entity as a result of the refugee crisis. The Schengen regime came 
under heavy scrutiny during the refugee crisis. In relation to the discussions on the Schengen 
regime, the visa liberalization talks with Turkey were also related with the refugee crisis 
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(Müftüler-Baç 2017). The EU positioned the accession negotiations and visa liberalization 
talks with Turkey next to Turkey’s level of cooperation with the EU on issues of migration 
and border security (Demirsu and Cihangir-Tetik 2018). This line of argument is being 
utilized by the MEPs who argue that the visa liberalization talks and the joint statement with 
Turkey on refugees threaten the geographical entity of Europe.  
 
As could be observed in this section, geographical constructions of Turkey are still present 
in the EP, although they are not much emphasized. As the EU, Europeanness and the norms 
associated with them started to be challenged by the growing number of refugees and 
terrorism, the EU’s normative power was subject to scrutiny. Thus, the increase in 
geographical debates carried a different background than they did in the pre-2013 period, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The excerpts above show that such debates are mostly 
utilized by far-right political groups. In the EP, it is observed that far-right groups use 
exclusivist geographical constructions of identity while center-left groups express more 
inclusivist discourses. In this framework, the already stagnated and deteriorated relations 
with Turkey were utilized by the MEPs to reconstruct the essential elements that define the 
EU and being European. As could be observed in the aforementioned excerpts, Turkey’s 
geographical background was used as a way of othering. Finally, it is crucial to note that in 
the available JPC meeting minutes, no geographical identity constructions are observed.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study was inspired by the current stagnated relations between the EU and Turkey. The 
motivational driver of this work is the fact that despite all the crises both actors had, they still 
continue their cooperation although they are both unwilling to show willingness towards 
membership. One of the root causes behind their unwillingness might be sought in their 
ideational constructs. In their extensive relationship, the contemporary literature accumulated 
various studies that explore ideational matters by using different methodologies and 
theoretical backgrounds. With the emergence of social constructivism after the Cold War, 
identity-based studies became prominent in the EU-Turkey relations. Methodologically, as 
the interaction between linguistics and foreign policy became more visible in the early 2000s, 
discourse analytic studies entered into the picture. Social constructivism and discourse 
analytic studies, however, started to interact later.  
 
Discourse analytic studies entered into the social constructivist realm much later, although 
they started to receive attention in a relatively short period of time. After 1999, ideational 
studies that explore discursive constructs in the EU-Turkey relations became common. More 
contemporary literature also has discursive studies that adopt a poststructuralist theoretical 
background. However, as the EU-Turkey relations started to stagnate after 2007 and took a 
different turn after the incidents in 2013, studies that explore identity constructions using 
linguistic tools became rare. The relations started to evolve into a strategic partnership after 
2013, while this shift has not been explored from an ideational perspective, especially from 
the EU’s perspective.  
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Guided by social constructivism and DHA, this thesis aimed to contribute to the literature on 
EU-Turkey relations by observing the shifts in discourses of identity in the EP debates. The 
EP, as an international parliament, diverges from national parliaments with the powers it 
contains. Especially in the enlargement procedure, it gradually acquired significant powers. 
Furthermore, the debates in the EP set the boundaries of the EU’s foreign policy. In addition, 
the political positions of the MEPs reflect the boundaries in which the EU officials can act. 
Benefitting from this background, the thesis aimed at exploring the shifts in discourses of 
identity through the speeches of the MEPs. The thesis also sought to observe the JPC 
meetings between 2013 and 2016 to reflect on the agenda items that shaped the EU-Turkey 
relations. 
 
The literature on identity constructions between 1999 and 2013 reveals different ideational 
themes that are pronounced the most. First, it is possible to observe Turkey as the EU’s 
geographical, cultural and historical other. Secondly, religious and civilizational 
constructions of identity were still prominent in this period and gained new meanings due to 
Turkey’s new government, AKP, which had its roots in Islam and the Ottoman heritage with 
a pro-Western attitude. With the EU’s several enlargement rounds and the milestones in the 
EU-Turkey relations, it is also possible to observe how the ideational constructs changed 
over time. Finally, the rise of the opposition in the EU to Turkey’s membership and Turkey’s 
domestic disputes weakened the relations while democratic and territorial identity 
constructions were emphasized. 
 
In the light of the literature, 2013 represents a key turning point for the EU-Turkey relations 
that changed the EU’s identity constructions towards Turkey. The AKP government in 
Turkey was challenged by the public demonstrations in Gezi Park and corruption 
investigations, which led to more undemocratic practices and authoritarian tendencies. 
Consequently, the literature argues that the EU’s approach to Turkey became more focused 
on strategic partnership and democracy. Indeed, the analysis of 18 EP debates and 1024 
speeches on Turkey between 2013 and 2016 demonstrated the political positions of the party 
groups in the EP. They also revealed the growing concerns of the EU on Turkey’s democracy 
and fundamental rights which led to the reconstruction of Europeanness through positioning 
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Turkey as the EU’s “undemocratic” other. Although it is not possible to come up with 
unifying positions across the political groups in the EP on Turkey, the majority of the MEPs 
voiced their growing concerns on Turkey’s deteriorating democracy while some MEPs 
focused on the destabilization of Turkey as a risk factor to the EU. Thus, democracy as an 
ideational theme continued to persist from the pre-2013 period by becoming the most 
emphasized theme towards Turkey. 
 
The analysis of the EP debates revealed other ideational themes that are still present in the 
EU-Turkey relations. Although they were not much emphasized, religion, civilization and 
geography were other ideational themes that were voiced by the MEPs in the debates on 
Turkey between 2013 and 2016. This represents a continuity with the pre-2013 period, in 
which these ideational themes were much at the forefront. What is visible in some of the 
religious constructions of identity is that Turkey was being constructed as an Islamist country 
that was led by a conservatist and Islamist government. When coined with the influx of 
refugees in Europe and the rise of Islamic State, Turkey was seen as a threat to Europe. In 
relation to this, the EU and Europeanness were being reconstructed as civilizational and 
geographical entities which have their roots in the European civilization and continent. This 
line of discourse could be tied to the rise of nationalist and Islamophobic sentiments in the 
EU, as religious, civilizational and geographical constructs of Turkey were mostly utilized 
by the right-wing party groups in the EP.  
 
Another issue that was prevalent in EU-Turkey relations is the growing strategic partnership 
between the two, sidelining Turkey’s membership prospects and ideational constructs. In 
relation to this, the remaining speeches that are not mentioned in this thesis mainly focus on 
developing EU-Turkey relations through making progress in Turkey’s accession 
negotiations. Because this thesis aimed at observing the ways in which Turkey is being 
othered by the EU, such strategic representations of Turkey or constructive approaches to the 
EU-Turkey relations are not mentioned. In addition, Turkey’s strategic position for the EU 
is not much emphasized in this thesis as well. However, further research that focuses on the 
discursive constructs of Turkey’s strategic partnership with the EU could be vital to 
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comprehend how the EU and Turkey position themselves as strategic actors especially in the 
post-2013 period while membership prospects are very much in decline.  
 
The period after the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016 may be vital to consider for similar 
discursive studies. In the literature, the coup attempt represents, as the Gezi Park Protests do, 
another crucial milestone for the EU-Turkey relations, in a way that Turkey’s alienation from 
the EU gained momentum. As the government in Turkey complained about the lack of 
support from the EU, the EU was more critical about the status of democracy and rule of law 
in Turkey. In addition, the EU and its identity have been challenged by Brexit and 
Eurosceptic voices within the EU. From this perspective, the EU’s enlargement policy may 
very much be studied in relation to new ideational constructs through discursive analyses.  
 
When conducting such discursive analyses, it is crucial to mention about the possible 
concerns regarding generalizability. As argued in this thesis, generalizability could not be 
sought in discursive analyses of the parliamentary speeches because speeches may not be a 
reflection of the party groups in the EP. However, it is possible to observe certain patterns in 
the party groups of the EP in the ways they construct identities. For instance, as this study 
aimed to show, the constructions of Turkey as the undemocratic other in the post-2013 period 
is shared by the majority of the MEPs and their political groups. However, religious, 
civilizational and geographical constructs of identity are mostly utilized by the center-right, 
far-right and Eurosceptic groups.  
 
Further discursive research could also consider the challenges that are put forward by this 
study in terms of data collection. As noted earlier, the debates in the EP are hold in several 
languages and are transcribed in those languages without their translations to English. For 
this reason, the simultaneous translations of the speeches should be listened through to 
transcribe the speeches that are not in English before conducting the discourse analysis. This 
represents a challenge for the data collection process.  
 
Finally, as the relations between the EU and Turkey develop, different theoretical 
backgrounds, such as poststructuralism, could be utilized in discursive studies to explore 
66 
 
different combinations of foreign policy and linguistics. Furthermore, the foreign policy of 
the EU could be studied further in relation to its enlargement policy as new candidate 
countries become member states.  
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